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PREVENTIVE LAW IN REAL PROPERTY
Introduction
One of the prerequisites of a dynamic society is the free
titles to real property that must be freely alienable. In the
United States we have this freedom to a marked degree.
The reference books in the field of real property have, as
their basis, court decisions resulting from situations where
there is a conflict of interest relating to title so serious
that a judgment or decree of court necessary to establish
the rights of the parties. There are, however, thousands of
real estate transactions occurring daily in the United States
in situations where it is not necessary to go to court, but there
are only a limited number of practice books dealing with this
branch of real property law. The purpose of this article is to
stress the techniques of practice which may obviate the neces-
sity of litigation.
Experience indicates that the great majority of titles are
marketable; that some few titles, while presently open to ob-
jection, are easily made marketable by securing deeds,
releases, or calling for the payment of past due charges
against the land; and that the percentage of titles which are
clouded with objections is extremely small. Experience fur-
ther indicates that as properties increase in value, additional
care is taken by the owners and their attorneys to see that the
title is always freely alienable. Thus, titles to large corporate
properties are apt to be in the best possible condition. The
old style practice of the family attorney who always found
"against the title" is hopelessly outdated, and an attorney
with such an outlook damages not only his client but also
society at large. Attorneys specializing in the field of real
property are under a duty to find "in favor of the title" and
if there are valid objections the title should be corrected in
such a manner that it will thereafter be freely alienable.
(s83)
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Practice by attorneys in this manner calls for a large meas-
ure of what may be termed "preventive law." An attorney
specializing in real property must devise solutions for all
kinds of quarrels; he must constantly mediate and conciliate
in order to reach a compromise that will satisfy opposing
parties, and he should be adept at unraveling business snarls.
If, after all this, the parties still fail to agree, it may then be
necessary to resort to the courts. It is to be remembered that
houses and industries must be built, schools and hospitals
must be erected, farm buildings must be repaired, or newly
constructed, and these things will be done only as titles to the
properties are made freely alienable by agreements among
the attorneys and by the settlement of controversies at every
leyel. Real property law thus becomes a part of the social
process.
If we were to make a diagram of a breakdown of a large
number of title reports for purposes of classification, we
would find that there are relatively few questions concerning
the sufficiency of the abstract and certificates of the abstrac-
ter. The number of situations increases when we come to the
subject of descriptions. Questions relating to deeds (their
execution, the signing, acknowledging, sealing and other
matters) are next in importance, and we reach the height of
the curve when we consider liens and encumbrances and pro-
bate proceedings. There is a trailing off at the end of the
curve, and the number of situations decreases rapidly as we
consider future interests, divorce, bankruptcy, tax deeds and
miscellaneous matters. The curve in the classification of the
title reports will run roughly as follows:
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closing in New York involving four parcels of property in
three counties in two states (two counties in the first state
and one county in the second state), and where the titles were
being insured by five title insurance companies,' the parties
present at the closing were as follows:
(a) One representative of the lender.
(b) Representatives from each title insurance company.
(c) Representatives from each of three borrowing cor-
porations.
(d) One Bishop along with his Chancellor and his at-
torney.
(e) One Supreme Court Justice from the State of New
York and his secretary.
(f) A counseling attorney representing the borrower for
one of the properties.
(g) A firm of attorneys from New York City representing
the two remaining borrowers.
(h) A group of Nuns from several places on the eastern
seaboard.
1 Since no one company had sufficient assets to take the entire risk, it was
necessary to divide the title insurance between several companies. The "call" for
title insurance was as follows:
Title is to be taken on the basis of title insurance and we have now been furnished
a preliminary title report from W. J. Guaranty Company of Camden, New Jersey,
and we have also been furnished two preliminary title reports from L. T. Corpora-
tion of New York, the latter covering the New York properties. The primary risk
in this case, in an amount of $250,000 is to be taken by W. J. Guaranty Company of
Camden, New Jersey, and the excess risk covering the New Jersey properties,
amounting to approximately $2,000,000, is to be divided about equally between L. T.
Corporation of Richmond, M. T. Company, and H. T. Guaranty Company of New
York. At closing, these companies should furnish the usual mortgagee's policies using
the A.T.A. revised form and the several policies covering the New Jersey properties
should be identical.
The coverage for the New York properties, amounting in round figures to $750,-
000 is to be furnished by L. T. Corporation of New York and we should be furnish-
ed either one or two title policies (depending upon the practice of the title company),
i.e., one for the full amount of $750,000 or two for approximately $690,000 for the
Olean, New York, property and $60,000 for the Catskill, New York, property. The
L. T. Corporation of New York. is to furnish mortgagee's policies using Form 280 of
L. T. Corporation of New York. The total coverage on all policies should amount
to $3,000,000 and all policies should show that the mortgage is a first and paramount
lien against the premises in question. The figures given above are not exact figures
but we prefer to work in round numbers rather than fractions.
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In any such case, it will be well to prepare a detailed outline
of the method of procedure to be followed at the closing, and
the steps in the outline should be followed closely.
Perhaps the classic closing situation involved the recent
transfer of title to the Empire State Building in New York
City. When the title was transferred, there were several hun-
dred people present and it was necessary to execute and pass
approximately six hundred documents bearing two thousand
signatures. To do this they had a preview on the day prior to
the closing and the actual closing was completed on the fol-
lowing day in seven and one half hours through use of a
thirty-three page memorandum of stage directions for the
people involved.la
Returning now to closing the transaction, anytime that we
examine a large number of abstracts for the purpose of classi-
fication, we find that encumbrances are usually of two kinds;
first, there are those of a general nature, such as mortgages,
taxes, leases, judgments and other matters, and second, there
are encumbrances of a special nature, such as easements,
covenants, restrictions and tax sales. Objections of a minor
nature may be set out if desired and may appear in the
opinion; however, the attorney should advise that these
minor objections be waived. Usually objections of a serious
nature are confined to defects which appear in the devolution
of title and many of these defects are capable of correction
by calling for particular instruments which may then be
recorded and should be shown in the chain of title.
It must be remembered that there are pitfalls resulting
from facts external to the record which must be carefully
watched in every transaction. These include the rights of
parties in possession, mechanics' liens, encroachments, and
special assessments for street improvements. An inspection
1a For a literary description of this and other real estate transactions in which
Roger L. Stevens was the moving force, see Kahn, Profiles - Closings and Openings.
NEw YORKER, Feb. 13, 1954, p. 37; Feb. 20, 1954, p. 41.
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of the property may reveal that the parties in possession
claim some interest in the land; for instance, they may be
holding under an unrecorded land contract. This inspection
will also show the existence of easements and party drive-
ways, the condition of the buildings and whether or not any
repairs have been made within the statutory period which
may result in mechanics' liens. A survey will show any en-
croachments that may exist and the variations of the physical
possession from the record title. In any situation where so
many facts and circumstances enter into the establishment of
a title, the existence or non-existence of any one of them may
be fatal.
I. The Abstracter and His Liability
When examining an abstract, it is very important that the
certificate of the abstracter cover the full period of time from
government entry down to the date of examination,2 for it is
an elementary rule of law that the abstracter is not liable for
mistakes or omissions that occur outside of the period of
examination.' Thus, an omission of a small fraction of time
should be called to the attention of the abstracter, who will
either correct and initial the certificate, or furnish an addi-
tional continuation covering the omitted period.
Where an abstracter undertakes to continue an abstract, or
abstract a title, for a limited period between specified dates
only, he need not include anything of record outside of such
period,4 nor anything within such period which does not affect
the title; and where he undertakes to examine certain records,
2 Under the contract the plaintiff was entitled to a record title, and to a true
abstract of title showing the state of the record up to the date of conveyance. Waters
v. Pearson, 163 Iowa 391, 144 N.W. 1026 (1914).
3 Douglas v. Title Trust Co., 80 Wash. 71, 141 Pac. 177 (1914).
4 An abstracter in simply adding an extension to an old abstract does not certi-
fy to or verify the accuracy of entries in such abstract prior to the first date given in
his certificate of extension. But where abstracter was to extend an abstract from
September 28, 1926 to January 4, 1930, he was held liable under a bond for failing
to note a tax sale on November 17, 1928. Marley v. McCarthy, 129 Neb. 880, 263
N.W. 385 (1935).
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or the records in certain offices only, the abstract need not
contain or set forth any matter not appearing on such records.5
In case the certificate of the abstracter does not cover the
entire period from the government patent down to the date
of examination or if the abstracter has omitted a specified
period of time, the examining attorney should require that
the abstract be amended or that a new continuation be furn-
ished. Reference is made to abstracts beginning with the date
of plat except in the State of Iowa (and possibly other loca-
tions) where the attorneys have met and agreed to accept
plat abstracts. This further refers to all omissions and dis-
crepancies in the certificates, and if there is an omission of
any period of time, no matter how short (fraction of an hour),
it should be called to the attention of the abstracter. These
omissions usually occur from mistakes common to all people
and the abstracter is always willing to correct any errors
called to his attention.
Since the preparation of an abstract requires special knowl-
edge and ability, the abstracter is liable for want of due care
and skill,' and an omission from the abstract of title of any
showing of a previous encumbrance gives rise to a cause of
action against the abstracter.7 The courts have held that the
abstracter is responsible, and some states have required that
a public bond be posted for the benefit of those who depend
upon his work as security for mistakes and. errors.' The
5 1 C.J.S., Abstracts of Title § 4 (1936).
o An abstracter occupies a position of trust towards his employer similar to an
attorney-client relationship. Vallette v. Tedens, 122 I1. 607, 14 N.E. 52 (1887).
Failure to examine the original records is a want of ordinary care. The abstracter
relied on the margin notation that a mortgage was satisfied, when the original docu-
ment disclosed that the mortgage was only "partially satisfied," the abstracter was
held liable. Wacek v. Frink, 51 Minn. 282, 53 N.W. 633 (1892).
7 However, there must be a direct causation and a showing that the injury
complained of was the direct result of the defect in the abstract. Denton v. Nash-
ville Title Co., 112 Tenn. 320, 79 S.W. 799 (1904) (Omission of a judgment). Econ-
omy Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. West Jersey Title & Guarantee Co., 64 NJ.L. 27, 44 Atl.
854 (1899) (Omission of a mortgage).
8 Such a bond is collateral security for the enforcement of the cause of action
but does not change it from a contract to a tort action and the contract Statute of
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
statutes of these states usually make the abstracter and his
sureties responsible not only to the person for whom the
abstract was made, but to all persons who purchased the land
or extend credit thereon in reliance upon the abstract.' In
states where there are no statutes upon the subject, the lia-
bility of an abstracter for loss due to his error is determined
and limited by the terms of his contract for employment."
In most cases there is a lack of contract between the ab-
stracter and the purchaser because the vendor furnishes the
abstract, and the result in these states is that there is seldom
any legal responsibility of the abstracter to the party injured
by his mistake or omission."
There has been a tendency lately to ignore this question of
privity of contract, thereby making the abstracter liable for
any loss by reason of his error, neglect or carelessness, and
this liability shall be to the one who sustains the loss by
Limitations still applies. It enlarges the class to whom the abstracter is liable. Mer-
rill v. Fremont Abstract Co., 39 Idaho 238, 227 Pac. 34 (1924) ; Commercial Bank
of Mott v. Adams County Abstract Co., 73 N.D. 645, 18 N.W.2d 15 (1945) ; Burton
v. DeBolt, 48 Okla. 352, 149 Pac. 1079 (1915) ; Goldberg v. Sisseton Loan & Title
Co., 24 S.D. 49, 123 N.W. 266 (1909) (Omission of a pending suit).
9 A typical statute provides: "The bond shall be conditioned for the payment
by the abstracter of any and all damages that may be sustained by or that shall
accrue to any person by reason or on account of any error, deficiency, or mistake in
any abstract or certificate of title, or continuation thereof, made and issued by the
abstracter." N.D. REV. CODE § 43-0111 (1943).
10 PATrox, TITLES § 27 (1938).
11 Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879) (Omission of prior recorded
deed); Shine v. Nash Abstract & Investment Co., 217 Ala. 498, 117 So. 47 (1928);
Equitable Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Commerce & Trust Co., 118 Tenn. 678, 102 S.W. 901
(1907). In a case where recovery was allowed because privity of contract did exist,
the court said that provisions of a certificate stating that the abstract company
would incur no liability by reason of its construction of records was inapplicable
where an outstanding recorded deed was omitted from the record. Guaranty Abstract
Co. v. Denman, 209 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
"In view of the custom prevailing in this state by virtue of which the vendor of
land procures the abstract and tenders it to the prospective purchaser, we are urged
to hold that an abstracter is liable to any other person who may suffer damage by
reason of reliance upon the negligent work of the abstracter. We are not aware that
the custom prevailing in this state is different from the custom prevailing elsewhere,
and we are not disposed to depart from the well established rule that he who claims
damages by reason of the negligence of an abstracter must trace his right thereto to
some contractual relations existing between him and the abstracter." Peterson v.
Gales, 191 Wis. 137, 210 N.W. 407, 409 (1926).
PREVENTIVE LAW IN REAL PROPERTY
reason of depending upon his work.12 In a good many cases
the abstracters themselves have recognized their moral re-
sponsibility, and their certificates have been changed to cover
"any person relying upon the abstract." A small minority of
courts have allowed recovery on the tort theory, holding that
the giving of the certificate and not the certificate itself con-
stituted negligence for which the abstracter is liable. The
importance in this theory lies in the fact that in the usual case
the defect or error is not discovered until a subsequent trans-
fer of the property, which often is after the Statute of Limi-
tations has run on the contract. 3 In a negligence or fraud
case the Statute of Limitations begins running At the time of
the discovery of the fraud and not the contract date.
II. Primary Defects in Title
Reference to the diagram at the beginning of this article
will indicate that attorneys engaged in practice have to deal
with liens and encumbrances in a decided majority of closing
transactions. Since these matters occur most frequently, the
balance of this article will consider these various primary
defects in title. In practice, the lien most frequently en-
countered is the lien resulting from an outstanding mortgage.
12 Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 43 Ariz. 219, 29 P.2d 1065
(1934) ; Brown v. Sims, 22 Ind. App. 317. 53 N.E. 779 (1899) (Omission of a pend-
ing suit); Western Loan & Savings Co. v. Silver Bow Abstract Co., 31 Mont.'448,
78 Pac. 774 (1904); Economy Building & Loan Ass'n v. West Jersey Title & Guar-
antee Co., 64 N.J.L. 27, 44 Atl. 854 (Sup. Ct. 1899) (Omission of a mortgage);
Anderson v. Sprietersbach, 69 Wash. 393, 125 Pac. 166 (1912).
In the above cases the courts have held that the abstracter is liable to third per-
sons relying on the abstract, usually on the basis that the abstract company had
knowledge that there would be such reliance. On the same theory they have denied
liability to an assignee of a mortgagee. Talpey v. Wright, 61 Ark 275, 32 S.W. 1072
(1895).
The abstracter omitted a judgment because at the time the abstract was made
there was an appeal pending. The lien of the judgment was not destroyed but only
suspended, and the abstracter had to pay the amount of the judgment. Denton v.
Nashville Title Co., 112 Tenn. 320, 79 S.W. 799 (1904).
13 Where the abstracter omitted a void tax deed, but the owner subsequently had
to pay for a quitclaim deed from the holder of the tax deed, it was held that the
abstract company was liable even though the tax deed was void. Hillock v. Idaho
Title & Trust Co., 22 Idaho 440, 126 Pac. 612 (1912).
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There are, however, other liens resulting from deeds of trust,
judgments, and taxes, together with a group of miscellaneous
liens and encumbrances resulting from probate proceedings,
levies and attachments, mechanics' liens, charges against the
land created by recitations in deeds, court costs, attorney's
fees, and others, which, whenever they appear, must be cared
for before the transaction is closed.
Whenever an attorney makes a mistake in the description
in a mortgage or deed, the mistake is easily corrected by a
supplementary mortgage or a correction deed. But when an
outstanding mortgage or judgment is missed, or when the
attorney decides that a certain mortgage has merged in the
title (when in fact, there was no merger) and the situation is
subsequently discovered, then the attorney may find it neces-
sary to defend his action by resorting to the courts. General-
ly, it takes no great deal of skill to discover outstanding
mortgages, or improper releases of these mortgages. But in
situations where present outstanding mortgages have passed
into the hands of trustees or receivers, of executors and ad-
ministrators, the problem of proper releases occurs again and
again, and a certain amount of experience is required before
the attorney is able to safeguard himself properly.
A. MORTGAGES
By the strict doctrine of common law, unmodified by the
intervention of equity for the protection of the debtor, a
mortgage was regarded as passing the whole legal title to the
estate pledged to the mortgagee, who became the owner of it,
although his title was liable to be defeated on a condition
subsequent. Also, at common law, a mortgage took effect at
the time of its execution and delivery, but the recording acts
now provide that mortgages shall take effect from the time
of recording. An unrecorded mortgage is good between the
parties but as to third persons having acquired a legal interest
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in or lien upon the property they take effect from the time
they are delivered to the recorder.
The English courts of equity began at an early date to look
with great disfavor upon the strict common law doctrine of
absolute forfeiture of the estate upon nonpayment of the
mortgage debt. 4 Accordingly, they established the rule that
in equity the debtor should still have a right to redeem after
the breach of the condition at law. This right to save the
estate in equity after the forfeiture at law was called the
"equity of redemption." The same designation came to be
applied to the interest or estate retained by the debtor after
conveyance of the legal title to the mortgagee by the mort-
gage deed. When a second mortgage is given, such equity is
the only estate in which the second mortgagee acquires an
interest. In equity a mortgage of land is regarded as a mere
lien or security for a debt. 5 Until foreclosure the mortgagor
continued to be the real owner of the fee. 6
In a majority of states, partly by force of statutes and partly
by the decisions of the courts, the common law doctrine of
mortgages has been abrogated. In a majority of states a
mortgage is nothing more than a lien or security for a debt,
passes no title or estate to the mortgagee and gives him no
right or claim to the possession 7 of the property. 8
A trust deed in the nature of a mortgage is a conveyance of
the property intended to be pledged, in fee simple, to one or
more trustees, who are to hold the same for the lawful owner
14 Kortright v. Cady, 21 N.Y. 343 (1860).
15 When the granting clause in a mortgage makes the conveyance subject to a
prior unrecorded mortgage, the grantee acquires only an equity of redemption, and
his estate can only be enlarged by the payment or discharge of the prior mortgage.
Riegel v. Belt, 119 Ohio St. 369, 164 N.E. 347 (1928).
10 59 CJ.S.,Mortgages §§ 813-22 (1949).
17 Park Nat. Bank v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 90 F. Supp. 275 (W.D. Mo.
1950), dismissed, 184 F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1950); Hawkins v. Snellings, 255 Ala. 659,
53 So.2d 552 (1951); Hemphill v. Nelson, 95 Fla. 498, 116 So. 498 (1928); Johnson
v. Board of Sup'rs, 237 Iowa 1103, 24 N.W.2d 449 (1946); Bloomer v. Southwest
Washington Ass'n, 36 Wash. 752, 220 P.2d 324 (1950).
18 59 C.J.S., Mortgages § 1 (1949).
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of the note, bond or other obligation secured, permitting the
grantor to retain the possession and enjoy the rents and pro-
fits of the estate until default shall be made in the payment
of the obligation secured. Such deeds contain a power giving
the trustee or trustees, upon such default, the right to make
a sale of the premises and satisfy the holder of the debt out
of the net proceeds, returning the surplus, if any, to the
grantor. Such an instrument, although executed to trustees
instead of directly to the creditor and although in form a
conveyance in trust, is essentially a mortgage, and will be
construed and enforced as such. 9
From the foregoing it will be seen that the execution and
delivery of a mortgage or trust deed does not transfer to the
mortgagee or trustee the right to possession of the mortgaged
premises nor the right to collect the rents therefrom which is
an incident of such right of possession. In the absence of an
agreement to the contrary, the mortgagor is entitled to retain
possession and to retain income until the mortgage is fore-
closed and the redemption period has expired.2"
Assignments. - Mortgages may be assigned, and the
transfer places one party in the place of the other in such a
way that all benefits and liabilities of the mortgagee pass to
the assignee. Assignments should be recorded in order to give
constructive notice of the contents of the assignment. Any
assignment of the mortgage security apart from the debt is a
nullity,"' and this appears to be true without reference to
19 Guaranty Title & Trust Co. v. Thompson, 93 Fla. 983, 113 So. 117 (1927);
Pledge of real property in whatever form, for payment of debt, constitutes a mort-
gage. Sanderson v. Engel, 182 Minn. 256, 234 N.W. 450 (1931) ; statutory interpre-
tation in LeBrun v. Prosise, 197 Md. 466, 79 A.2d 543 (1951). See collected cases in
Decennial Digests, Mortgages Key 1.
20 59 C.J.S., Mortgages § 300 (1949).
21 If there is no debt there is no mortgage. Dewberry v. Bank of Standing Rock,
227 Ala. 484, 150 So. 463 (1933) ; Western Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Scheib, 218 Cal. 386,
23 P.2d 745 (1933). Mortgage held not assignable where there was never any debt
due from mortgagor to mortgagee, and mortgage constituted mere paper trans-
action, and was so understood by parties thereto. General Ice Cream Corp. v. Stern,
291 Mass. 86, 195 N.E. 890 (1935). Mortgage is mere security, and has no efficacy
if unaccompanied by debt or obligation. Shriver v. Sims, 127 Neb. 374, 255 N.W. 60
(1934).
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whether the mortgagee has the legal title. The right to pro-
ceed against the land as security can exist only in favor of the
holder of the debt secured. Thus assignment of the debt
secured by a mortgage carries with it the security.
Generally, the obligation and the debt are transferred to-
gether, and if not, the holder of the mortgage security holds
the title in trust for the owner of the obligation.22 Therefore,
the attorney may assume that the mortgage and the debt were
assigned to the same person, and he is entitled to rely on the
record and would be protected in calling for a release from
the assignee unless he had outside knowledge of facts that
would lead him to believe otherwise. In any such case, the
attorney should protect himself by calling in the cancelled
note and mortgage. In states where the legal title is vested
in the mortgagee, the title may remain in him even though
he has assigned the debt, but in the view of a court of equity,
the title is held for the benefit of the holders of the debt, and
the security in its beneficial, as distinct from its purely legal
aspect, belongs to the holder of the debt. In states where the
mortgagee has a lien, as opposed to the title, any conveyance
of the land only, is invalid.'
Where an abstract contains an entry of a mortgage in favor
of one party and the mortgage is subsequently released by
another party, the release is not satisfactory, and the attorney
should call for evidence of the assignment.24 If there was no
22 Assignment of second note is sufficient to transfer trust deed or mortgage
without a further written assignment. Lewis v. Booth, 3 Cal.2d 345, 44 P.2d 560
(1935); Long v. Taggart, 214 Iowa 941, 243 N.W. 200 (1932); Collins v. W. C.
Briggs, Inc., 98 Fla. 422, 123 So. 833 (1929).
23 Legal owner of secured note failing to properly note fact of purchase, held,
nevertheless entitled to benefit of mortgage lien as against assignee of mortgage
without endorsement or delivery of note. Rockford Trust Co. v. Purtell, 183 Ark.
918, 39 S.W.2d 733 (1931).
24 Marginal endorsements, showing satisfaction by person not beneficiary, did
not constitute valid cancellation of mortgage. Mills v. Kemp, 196 N.C. 309, 145 S.E.
557 (1928). Where assignment of mortgage is not recorded, assignee assumes risk of
mortgage debt being conclusively presumed to be in person or corporation holding
recorded title of mortgage. Baltimore American Ins. Co. v. Ulman, 165 Md. 630, 170
AUt. 202 (1934).
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assignment, it will be necessary to call for a release from the
original mortgagee. If the attorney has information relating to
an unrecorded assignment, directions should be given for the
recording of the assignment and its release by the assignee.
In accordance with the facts in the particular case the assign-
ments and the release should be cared for, both in fact and
according to the record, to the satisfaction of the attorney,
and if there is any question about these matters, the can-
celled instruments should be called in for examination by the
attorney.25
Parties Releasing. - In several states releases made on the
margin of the record are acceptable, but certain states have
by statute declared that a release of a mortgage should be
made "by separate instrument." 26 Although there are cases
25 Under Maryland law, if real estate mortgage is released of record the notes
secured by mortgage are conclusively presumed to be paid so far as a lien upon
realty is concerned. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 66, § 26 (1951). Kramer v.
United States, 190 F.2d 712 (4th Cir. 1951). Fact that note and trust deed sued on
continued in possession of lender without being cancelled and released raised a pre-
sumption that debt secured had not been paid but such presumption was not con-
clusive. Loucks v. Luckel, 107 Cal. App.2d 217, 236 P.2d 905 (1951). When grantor
in a security deed pays the debt secured thereby, he is entitled to the security deed
with an entry of cancellation and it is his duty to have the entry of satisfaction and
cancellation entered upon the record. GA. CODE § 67-1306 (1933). Burgess v. Sim-
mons, 207 Ga. 291, 61 S.E.2d 410 (1950). Trustee's demand for indemnifying bond
bcfore releasing trust deed is not wrongful or illegal, where note secured is not pro-
duced by mortgagor. O'Connor v. Brower, 262 Ill. App. 621 (1931). Possession of
mortgage and note by grantee of mortgaged premises creates strong presumption of
payment, rebuttable only by very clear proof. Rorke v. LaDuke, 260 Mich. 105, 244
N.W. 247 (1932). Makers suing to restrain foreclosure of deed of trust securing note
had burden of showing payment of the note. Bay v. Elmer, 237 S.W.2d 932 (Mo.
App. 1951). See collected cases in Decennial Digests, Mortgages Key 319 (1).
26 Wis. STAT. § 235.55 (1951). Entry of satisfaction of mortgage on margin of
record thereof raised only prima face presumption of payment as between parties
thereto. Wilson v. Federal Land Bank, 230 Ala. 75, 159 So. 493 (1935). Where the
statute provided certain methods by which a mortgage lien on real estate may be
released; i.e., (1) By an entry on the margin of the record signed by the mortgagee,
(2) discharged on record by proper officers on the presentation of a certificate signed
by the mortgagee, (3) a court decree, held that quitclaim deed from the mortgagee
to mortgagor did not discharge mortgage and the debt was not extinguished. "And
while appellants were put upon inquiry, it was not enough for them to examine the
record and see that no assignment of the first mortgage appeared thereon, but they
should have required a satisfaction of the mortgage, evidenced in one of the ways
prescribed by the statute; otherwise they proceeded at their peril in dealing with the
mortgaged property on the assumption that the title to the first mortgage was still
in the original mortgagee." Merchants Trust Co. v. Davis, 49 Idaho 494, 290 Pac.
383, 386 (1930). In accord, Miller v. Paul, 237 Ill. App. 166 (1925).
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to the effect that a release by one of two mortgagees is accept-
able, it would appear that the better rule is that the release
is effective only against those signing. Releases executed
under power of attorney should be predicated upon a power
executed with the same formalities as a deed, and the power
of attorney should be recorded. Releases by corporate mort-
gagees do not require any action on the part of the board of
directors.
Proper precautions should be taken to see that the release
of any mortgage by executors and administrators, by re-
ceivers of insolvent banks, or by guardians or minors or
incompetents, was properly authorized. Thus, where a mort-
gage is released by the receiver of a bank, the abstract should
show the appointment and qualification of the receiver, and
any such party must have been acting as receiver at the time
of the release. And where there is an outstanding mortgage in
favor of a party who subsequently dies, the mortgage should
be released by the personal representative, and the appoint-
ment and qualification of the personal representative should
be shown on the abstract. If the estate is closed, then sufficient
proceedings from the estate of the decedent should be shown
on the abstract to enable the attorney to determine "who
were the proper and sole legatees, devisees, or heirs-at-law"
of the decedent, and the release should then be executed by
the proper parties.27 It is to be noted that a guardian, admin-
istrator or executor may execute a release of a mortgage
without an order of court.28
The Reviving Junior Mortgage. - The matter of the re-
vival of junior mortgages is one of the most complicated that
27 If, upon the settlement of an estate, the residue consists in part of a note and
mortgage, it may be assigned in that form to the persons entitled thereto. The order
of assignment has the effect of an order of distribution to transfer the title to the
persons named. Ford v. Smith, 60 Wis. 222, 18 N.W. 925 (1884).
28 A mortgagee's administrator may, for a consideration, discharge the mortgage
and if the heirs consent to the allowance of the administrator's account which in-
cludes the consideration, they cannot later come in and have the release set aside.
Merriman v. Westlawn Cemetery Ass'n, 304 Mich. 12, 7 N.W.2d 126 (1942).
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will come to the attention of any attorney examining title.
The purpose of an action to foreclose a mortgage or deed of
trust is to extinguish the right of redemption. We know that
junior encumbrances including mortgages, judgments and
other liens may be cut off by foreclosure if the parties holding
the junior encumbrances are properly made parties to the
proceedings. Therefore when two or more mortgages on
property are owned by different persons and the first mort-
gagee forecloses, properly joining the junior encumbrancers
as parties defendant, then purchase by a stranger at a valid
sheriff's sale will effectively cut off the junior mortgagees and
instructions may be given to disregard them.29
Different rules apply where title is reconveyed to the mort-
gagor after foreclosure of the first mortgage and after junior
encumbrances have presumably been cut off. The facts are as
follows: A.B. and C.D. give a first mortgage to the M.N.
Company and subsequent thereto the same parties give a
second mortgage to the O.P. Company. Later the M.N. Com-
pany forecloses its mortgage properly joining the O.P. Com-
pany as a party defendant. After foreclosure the M.N.
Company, having acquired title by sheriff's deed subsequent-
ly sells the property to A.B. and C.D. the original mortgagors,
and the question to be considered is whether the reacquired
title of A.B. and C.D. inures to the benefit of a second mort-
gagee, the O.P. Company, by reason of the covenant of war-
ranty in the mortgage.
The judicial decisions covering the point are about evenly
divided. The question ultimately depends on the reaction of
the courts to the following propositions: first, in a foreclosure
sale, is the interest of all parties to the action sold, or does
such sale effectively convey only the interest of the mort-
gagor; second, what is the effect of the covenant of warranty
in the mortgage? One line of decisions deals only with the
29 Where mortgagee foreclosed and became purchaser at foreclosure sale, but
failed to join holder of an interest in the premises as a party defendant, any sub-
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covenant of warranty in the second mortgage, and from such
a discussion they reason that the junior encumbrances re-
attach; the other line reaches the opposite conclusion by say-
ing that the interests of all parties to the foreclosure suit
were acquired at the foreclosure sale and that the junior en-
cumbrances do not reattach.
In a leading case in Massachusetts ° A gave first and second
mortgages to B and C. B foreclosed his mortgage and the land
was subsequently conveyed to the mortgagor. Suit was
brought by an assignee of C and since the second mortgage
contained a general warranty of title, the court, by the late
Mr. Justice Holmes, held that the second mortgage reattach-
ed as a lien when the mortgagor came back into the title. No
question of fraud or collusion was raised in the case. The
headnote succinctly states the rule of the case: Where a
mortgagor gives a second mortgage with covenant of war-
ranty as against the first mortgage, and the first mortgage is
foreclosed, and the title obtained by the foreclosure is after-
wards conveyed to the mortgagor, the title thereby acquired
inures to the benefit of the second mortgagee.
However, in another Massachusetts case"' the court held
that the second mortgage will not be revived if the covenant
of warranty therein specifically excepts the first mortgage.
The same doctrine has been followed in Missouri 2 and Wis-
sequent conveyance of interest in the property resting on purchase at such fore-
closure sale was equally ineffectual as to omitted party and as affecting his right of
redemption. OKLA. STAT. tit. 42 § 18 (1951). State ex rel. Com'rs of Land Office v.
Loose, 204 Okla. 88, 227 P.2d 402 (1951). A bona fide purchaser for value from a
purchaser at a mortgage foreclosure sale takes free from the equities of the mort-
gagor and a second mortgagee. First Nat. Bank v. Brown, 207 Wis. 272, 240 N.W.
381 (1932).
30 Ayer v. Philadelphia & B. Face Brick Co., 157 Mass. 57, 31 N.E. 717 (1892),
rehearing, 159 Mass. 84, 34 N.E. 177 (1893).
31 Huzzey v. Heffernan, 143 Mass. 232, 9 N.E. 570 (1887).
32 In the Missouri case Greene purchased property "subject to" a first and prior
deed of trust executed by the former owner, held: that the second deed of trust did
not revive. The court gave as a reason, the fact that the second deed of trust was
made subject to the first, and that the holder of the second deed of trust knew the
foreclosure was taking place and did not protect his lien by paying off the first trust
deed or by redeeming from the foreclosure. Greene v. Spitzer, 343 Mo. 751, 123
S.W.2d 57 (1938).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
consin3 3 The Wisconsin court held that where purchasers at
a mortgage foreclosure sale had purchased for their own bene-
fit and there was no collusion between them and the mort-
gagor, the lien of the mortgagee under another mortgage
which had been cut off by the foreclosure sale and which
expressly excepted the foreclosed mortgage in the clause con-
taining covenants of seizin and warranty, was not revived by
the mortgagor's purchase from those who had purchased at
the foreclosure sale. However, the Court went further and
stated thatssa
Unless it expressly or circumstantially appears that the
bidding in of the property at the foreclosure sale was, in effect
a redemption, by the landowner as distinguished from a pur-
chase by the bidder, the lien of a mortgage cut off by the
foreclosure judgment is not revived'by subsequent acquisition
of title by the landowner.
An attorney examining title is in no position to determine
whether the foreclosure sale was, in effect, a redemption by
the mortgagor as distinguished from a sale to the bidder; the
facts relating to these matters vary with each case and allow
the courts to decide such cases either way. The examining
attorney thus has no alternative, and must call for a release
of the second mortgage.
There are cases in Alabama, California, Massachusetts,
Minnesota and Tennessee which hold that any covenant of
warranty in a junior mortgage that does not expressly except
the first mortgage will result in revival as against the original
mortgagor who reacquires the title.3 4 As opposed to this doc-
trine there are cases holding that a foreclosed mortgage can-
33 Federal Farm Mortgage Corp. v. Larson, 227 Wis. 221, 278 N.W. 421 (1938).
33a Id., 278 N.W. at 424.
34 Stewart v. Anderson, 10 Ala. 504 (1846); Jensen v. Duke, 71 Cal. App. 210,
234 Pac. 876 (1925); Ayer v. Philadelphia & B. Face Brick Co., 157 Mass. 57, 31
N.E. 717 (1892), rehearing, 159 Mass. 84,34 N.E. 177 (1893); Sandwich Mfg. Co. v.
Zellmer, 48 Minn. 408, 51 N.W. 379 (1892). Where mortgagor inserts in second
mortgage covenants of warranty against incumbrances without expressly excepting
first mortgage lien, he will be estopped from disputing lien of unsatisfied second
mortgage on reacquiring title through foreclosure of first mortgage. Home Owners'
Loan Corp. v. Guaranty Title Trust Co., 168 Tenn. 118, 76 S.W.2d 109 (1934).
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not be revived in Pennsylvania, Louisiana and Florida. The
Supreme Court of Louisiana35 held that junior mortgages are
not revived when the original mortgagor reacquires the
property stating:
We do not understand the contention to be made that the
mortgage revived automatically as the necessary legal effect
of the Russels having reacquired the property. They had not
committed any fraud, or done any act which might preclude
them from reacquiring the property without this mortgage
reviving. They stood as free as anybody else to acquire the
property from the homestead association; and, of course, to
acquire it just as this association held it; i.e., free of this
mortgage.
The headnote in the Pennsylvania case36 states their rules
very clearly:
Where a vendor or mortgagor either sells or mortgages land
which he does not own, and afterwards obtains the title thereto,
he will not be permitted to set up this after-acquired title to
defeat his previous grant or mortgage, for this would be to
permit him to perpetrate a fraud on his grantee or creditor. But
this rule has no application where -the lien of a mortgage is
discharged by a sale under a prior mortgage, and the purchaser
conveys the title to the mortgaged property back to the mort-
gagor, who in the meantime has been discharged in bankruptcy.
In such case the lien is not revived, but is lost.
The court said that to hold that the purchase worked a revival
of the extinguished debt and mortgage was a clear mistake
without the shadow of authority for its support.
The Florida cases hold that in the absence of fraud or
collusion, junior mortgages cut off by foreclosure will not re-
attach." However, an attorney examining the record has no
35 Commercial-Germania Trust & Savings Bank v. Russell, 148 La. 334, 86 So.
831, 832 (1920).
36 Rauch v. Dech, 116 Pa. 157, 9 Atl. 180 (1887).
37 Where prior mortgage assumed by mortgagors as part of purchase price when
they purchased property and which they agreed to pay was foreclosed and mort-
gagors subsequently repurchased property from purchaser at foreclosure sale, title
under such repurchase did not inure to benefit of subsequent mortgagee. Waldock v.
Tba, 114 Fla. 786, 153 So. 915 (1934), affirming, 114 Fla. 786, 150 So. 231 (1933),
rehearing granted, 114 Fla. 786, 150 So. 803 (1933), following Murray v. Newsom,
111 Fla. 193, 149 So. 387 (1933). Where junior mortgage was extinguished in fore-
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opportunity to judge the motives of the parties, and the
absence of fraudulent intent cannot very well be assumed in
any case. The facts relating to collusion opens a field of
speculation which allows courts to decide these cases either
way. Therefore, in all such cases the attorney should call for
a release of the second mortgage unless there has been such a
lapse of time between the acquisition of title through fore-
closure by the mortgagee and the subsequent conveyance of
that title to the original owners that the matter may be con-
sidered as an ordinary business risk by the examining at-
torney. Even in this latter situation, the decisions of the
court in the particular jurisdiction must be against revival.
We thus have two conflicting theories relating to legal
rights. One theory says that the interests of all parties to the
foreclosure suit are acquired at the foreclosure sale; that the
lien of the first mortgage must be free and must carry with it
a clear right to convey to anyone, even to the former owner
of the property. The other line of decisions protects the rights
of creditors by discussing the covenant of warranty in the
second mortgage and from such a discussion they reason that
the junior encumbrances reattach. The first theory imposes
on the second mortgagee an imputation of contributory negli-
gence unless he protects his interests by buying in at the sale
or by redeeming from the sale. It would seem that if the court
has jurisdiction to decree a sale, then that sale must be con-
clusive and the title of the purchaser must be absolute. In
addition, such title should include the rights of all parties
joined in the action.
If the second mortgagee has had his day in court and has
protected his rights, he has probably been given a deficiency
judgment and this judgment would attach to the foreclosed
land if reacquired by the mortgagor. The courts which hold
closure of another mortgage, mortgagor's reacquiring title from purchaser at mort-
gage'foreclosure sale did not inure to benefit of holder of junior mortgage. Murray
v. Newsom, 111 Fla. 193, 149 So. 387 (1933).
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that second mortgages revive are protecting the rights of
creditors and whether anyone who lends money with the
knowledge that he is getting a second or third mortgage is
deserving of the protection of the courts is a matter that may
well be questioned.
The magic of our "covenants of warranty" should not be
extended to help persons who make bad investments. There
is no doubt that the courts which hold that liens are revived
discourage adequate bidding at the foreclosure sale, and this
is understandable, since the revival theory is a trap for the
unwary purchaser. As the matter now stands, in any situation
where there is a possibility of revival, an examining attorney
should require that the danger of attack, or of an adverse
decision, be avoided. This may be done by insisting on a
release of the second mortgage or deed of trust or by having
the attorney obtain a court decree cutting off the possible
claim of the holder of the second mortgage or deed of trust.
A third alternative is to require an owner's policy of title in-
surance and to insist that the title policy be issued free and
clear of any objection relating to the possible revival of the
junior mortgages.
Rules on Merger. - In law, merger always takes place
when a greater and a lesser estate coincide meeting in one and
the same person, in one and the same right, without any inter-
mediate estate. The lesser estate is annihilated and merged
with the greater. However a court of equity is not bound by
the rules of law and may sometimes hold a charge extinguish-
ed when it would subsist at law, and sometimes preserve it
when at law it would be merged. This depends upon the in-
tention, actual or presumed, of the person in whom the inter-
ests are united."
38 In re Rupp, 35 F. Supp. 887 (E.D. Pa. 1940); Batten v. Kern, 16 Cal. App.2d
414, 60 P.2d 338 (1936); Continental IlI. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Cunningham,
291 Ill. App. 180, 9 N.E.2d 664 (1937); Ponstein v. Van Dyk, 282 Mich. 350, 276
N.W. 475 (1937); In re Whipple's Estate, 19 N.Y.S.2d 105 (Surr. Ct. 1940); Mus-
selman v. Sharswood Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 323 Pa. 550, 187 AtI. 419 (1936); Cleary v.
Batz, 225 Wis. 82, 273 N.W. 463 (1937).
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This intention is a question of fact to be tried and deter-
mined in the same manner as are other issues. It comes to
repel the prima facie presumption 9 of a merger which arises
from the union of legal and equitable estates in the same per-
son at the same time. The intention is generally determined
by the interest of the owner, and if the owner has an interest
in keeping the titles distinct or if there is an intervening right
between the lein and the title, there will be no merger."
One of the latest cases on this question of merger in Wisconsin
states that a subsequent purchaser cannot rely on a merger
from the appearance of the record; there must in fact be a
merger of the estates in the same person." The same rule is
upheld by other courts."
Where an attorney is examining a title, questions relating
to merger arise in the following manner:
1. An abstract reveals that A gives first and second mort-
gages to B and subsequently B forecloses the first mort-
39 Generally, party alleging that transfer of mortgagor's interest in mortgaged
property to mortgagee did not result in merger of lien into ownership has burden of
proving such fact. Kansas Seventh Day Adventist Conference Ass'n v. Williams, 156
Kan. 555, 134 P.2d 626 (1943).
40 Ponstein v. Van Dyk, 282 Mich. 350, 276 N.W. 475 (1937); Delaware Nat.
Bank v. Wiss, 158 Misc. 576, 284 N.Y. Supp. 615 (County Ct. 1936). Accord, Clark
v. Rowell, 163 Misc. 777, 298 N.Y. Supp. 232 (County Ct. 1937); In re Sheines'
Estate, 198 Misc. 59, 96 N.Y.S.2d 105 (Surr. Ct. 1950). Where the mortgagee
acquires a fee or equity of redemption from the mortgagor or a subsequent owner,
the lesser title is swallowed up by the larger if the property at time of the convey-
ance is equal in value to the mortgage debt, except that in equity this rule does not
obtain where the parties intended to keep the mortgagee alive. Armstrong v.
Germain, 98 N.Y.S.2d 946 (County Ct. 1949); Cleary v. Batz, 225 Wis. 82, 273
N.W. 463 (1937). See collected cases in Decennial Digests, Mortgages, Key 295(2).
41 There cannot be a merger of a mortgage lien and the fee title unless the two
estates actually vest in the same person; hence, a subsequent purchaser cannot rely
upon a merger from the appearance of the record - there must in fact be a merger
of the estates in the same person. Thauer v. Smith, 213 Wis. 91, 250 N.W. 842 (1933).
42 Manktelow v. Nevlezer, 200 Misc. 536, 107 N.Y.S.2d 688 (County Ct. 1951) ;
Rieth v. Bebe Realty Associates, 122 N.J. Eq. 67, 192 Atl. 378 (Ch. 1937); Saline
County v. Thorp, 337 Mo. 1140, 88 S.W.2d 183 (1935). Acceptance by first mort-
gagee of quit-claim deed to mortgaged premises without actual knowledge of exist-
ence of second mortgage, where first mortgage and note were not canceled or sur-
rendered, held not to extinguish first mortgage so as to subordinate it to second
mortgage. Beal v. Alschuler, 277 Mich. 66, 268 N.W. 813 (1936). Conveyance of
mortgaged land by mortgagor's grantee thereof to mortgagee did not bar foreclosure
of mortgage against mortgagor, even if conveyance effected merger of equitable and
legal titles to land. Beamer v. Shrader, 47 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1950).
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gage and buys in at the sheriff's sale. The attorney can-
not assume that the second mortgage was merged in the
title and a call should be made for the release of the
second mortgage.
2. A gives a first mortgage to B and a second mortgage to
C. Subsequently B assigns the first mortgage to C and
then A, the original borrower, gives a warranty deed to
C in lieu of foreclosure. In spite of the fact that the
mortgages have presumably merged in the title, both
mortgages should be released.
3. The same rules should be enforced against an estate. If
A gives first and second mortgages to B and B fore-
closes the first mortgage and thereafter dies, a release
of the second mortgage should be executed by the per-
sonal representative of B.
According to the above rules no merger results (unless
there is an expression of intention to that effect) in any situa-
tion where it will be contrary to the legitimate interest of the
owner of the rights involved. Since merger is so generally a
matter of intention, a purchaser should require that encum-
brances be discharged of record unless the showing of satis-
faction by merger is clear and certain. As a matter of good
practice a call should be made for the release of all merged
mortgages. A purchaser cannot rely upon a merger from the
appearance of the record.43 They must go beyond such appear-
ance and ascertain whether there has been a merger in fact,
and they act at their own peril if they do not require their
grantor to procure the mortgage and note supposed to be
merged and discharge the mortgage of record, or show that it
constitutes a part of the title to the estate.
43 To permit the prospective purchaser to conclusively decide for himself whether
a merger of the two interests resulted from the execution and delivery of a deed
from the original mortgagor to the apparent record holder of the mortgage is going
farther than was intended by the recording act. He should not deal with the fee
title on the assumption that the mortgage is discharged unless it is discharged of
record in the manner provided by the statutes, or by a judgment of a court. Thauer
v. Smith, 213 Wis. 91, 250 N.W. 842 (1933).
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B. TRUST DEEDS
A trust deed is a conveyance of property to a person or
corporation as trustee for the purpose of securing a debt or
other obligation with a power of sale in the trustees, upon
default, to apply the proceeds from the sale in payment of the
debt. A deed of trust conveys the legal title to the trustee,
and it remains in him until the debt is paid or until a sale is
made upon default. The trustee, therefore, may foreclose
under the power of sale contained in the trust deed, and there
is no statutory or other right of redemption after sale unless
the foreclosure is by court action. If there is any question as
to whether an instrument is a mortgage or a trust deed, the
instrument will be considered a mortgage.4
While the trust deed conveys to the trustee the entire legal
title for the purpose of the trust, yet under the rule that a
trustee takes only such estate as is necessary to the execution
of the trust, the title of the trustee lies dormant until the
necessity for foreclosure arises and prior to that time he has
none of the legal incidents of ownership, and the trustor or his
successors can convey mortgage or otherwise deal with the
property subject, however, to the trust deed.45
Whenever there is a large trust deed securing a bond issue
providing for foreclosure by sale by the trustee or by a court
action, then this "trust deed or mortgage" is ordinarily treat-
44 Banta v. Wise, 135 Cal. 277, 67 Pac. 129 (1901); LaArcada Co. v. Bank of
America, 120 Cal. App. 397, 7 P.2d 1115 (1932); Martin v. Rockford Trust Co., 281
Ill. App. 441 (1935); Cameron v. Campbell, 176 Tenn. 589, 144 S.WV.2d 775 (1940).
45 One who gives a deed of trust still has right to bring a quiet title action.
Charles A. Warren Co. v. San Francisco Saving Union, 153 Cal. 771, 96 Pac. 807
(1908). A "deed of trust" differs from a "mortgage" in that title passes from trustor
to trustee under a deed of trust, while, in case of mortgage, a mortgagor retains
title; the statute of limitations never runs against power of sale in a deed of trust,
while it does run against a mortgage; and mortgagor has statutory right of redemp-
tion after foreclosure, while no such right exists under a deed of trust. Py v. Pleitner,
70 Cal. App.2d 576, 161 P.2d 393 (1945). A mortgage or trust deed in nature of
mortgage vests legal title to mortgaged land in mortgagee as against mortgagor, but
only for protection of mortgagee's interests. Miller v. Frederick's Brewing Co., 405
Ill. 591, 92 N.E.2d 108 (1950). See collected cases in Decennial Digests, Mortgages
Keys 137-38.
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ed as a mortgage in which case the statutory right of redemp-
tion exists. In any action affecting a trust deed, both the
trustee and beneficiary of record should be made parties.
Trust deed covering a minor's or incompetent's interest can
be executed only upon proper order of court.
Releasing Before Maturity. - An attorney must exercise
greater care in passing on the release of trust deeds than is
ordinarily required in passing on the release of mortgages.
The power of the trustee is to some extent limited. Since he
holds title and exercises his authority for the benefit of the
legal holders of the indebtedness, and because the evidences
of the indebtedness are usually negotiable, the incident of the
lien will follow the note or bond to the last endorsee, and it is
therefore necessary that the terms for the release of the trust
deed be followed strictly." For this reason it is often required
that the cancelled notes or bonds be sent in; surrender con-
stituting a satisfactory showing that they were paid.
A deed of trust is, in effect, a mortgage with a power of
sale. The trustee holds title for the benefit of a third party,
and since the beneficiaries have certain rights which must be
protected, a release by the trustee before maturity of the debt
is not acceptable4 Usually a deed of trust securing a large
issue of bonds will have a provision to the effect that the
trustee may release prior to maturity upon giving a certain
prescribed notice to the bondholders. But deeds of trust for a
46 In equity, release unauthorized by terms of trust or by cestui que trust will
have no effect on trust deed as between original parties or as to subsequent pur-
chasers with notice, Phelps v. American Mortgage Co., 6 Cal.2d 604, 59 P.2d 95
(1936). Parties who secured release of trust deed were bound to know that trustee
had no authority to deal with trust estate or bind holders of bonds secured by deed
of trust except as expressly conferred by the deed of trust or necessarily incident
thereto. Prudence Co. v. Garvin, 130 Fla. 680, 179 So. 127 (1936). Only the true
holder of a note secured by a deed of trust can satisfy the record. Mo. REV. STAT. §
3465 (1949). Simmon v. Marion, 227 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. App. 1950). See collected
cases in Decennial Digests, Mortgages Key 309(2).
47 Where purchaser h~d notice from abstract that trustee releasing trust deed
held title for third party and that notes were not due and contained no prepayment
privilege, release was invalid as between holder of notes and purchaser. Kennell v.
Herbert, 342 ll. 464, 174 N.E. 558 (1930), reversing, 253 Ill. App. 252 (1929).
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small amount which secure a single note or bond often do not
have such a provision, and it is in these cases that releases by
the trustee alone, before maturity, are not acceptable. A re-
lease made by a trustee before the maturity of the indebted-
ness is not satisfactory unless the provisions of the deed of
trust expressly provide therefor, and a new release should be
procured from the trustee with the beneficiaries joining, and
a call should be made to have the cancelled notes sent in.48
Large Bond Issues. - Whenever a corporation executes an
instrument securing a bond issue, the instrument is usually in
the form of a trust deed and made to a trustee. The trustee
may be either an individual or a corporation, and the trust
deed usually provides that on the resignation of the trustee,
the trust shall vest in the survivor or survivors. The trustee
derives his powers from the trust agreement, and payment to
the trustee will constitute payment to the bondholders only
when made at the time and in the method prescribed by the
terms of the deed.49 Generally, an application for a loan is
made, and the lending corporation is informed that the money
to retire the outstanding bonds is needed at a certain time.
Directions must then be given for calling the bonds in accord-
ance with the terms of the trust deed, but a partial release is
not to be accepted unless the trust agreement gives this speci-
fic power. A large trust deed securing an issue of bonds usually
contains a provision authorizing prepayment, based on notice
to the bondholders calling the bonds in for payment, and such
a release is proper.
Any action by the trustee not authorized by the trust agree-
ment, is generally regarded as a deliberate assumption of
48 PATTON, TITLES § 310 (1938). McPherson v. Rollins, 107 N.Y. 316, 14 N.E.
411 (1887).
49 Under trust deed authorizing trustee to receive from mortgagor all money paid
on bonds and to apply payments according to terms of bonds, and that upon pay-
ment by mortgagor trustee should on demand release trust deed and mortgagor
should be considered fully released, money paid by mortgagor to trustee was received
by trustee as agent of bondholder, and mortgagor was not responsible thereafter for
proper application of amount paid. In re Church's Will, 221 Wis. 472, 266 N.W. 210
(1936).
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power"° and where the powers are set out there is no excuse
for the exercise of discretion."' The trustee should be request-
ed to call for all bonds in accordance with the terms of the
trust agreement, and a sufficient sum of money should be
deposited with the fiscal or transfer agent to redeem all bonds.
The attorney should see that the terms of call and release of
the bonds are complied with and that the money for the re-
lease of the bonds is on deposit at the proper time and with
the proper agent and that the required notice has been given.
If the terms of the agreement are followed then it makes no
difference whether or not all of the bonds were turned in. All
interest payments will cease on the date of redemption pro-
vided that proper notice has been given, and the attorney and
trustee will be protected. If there is any doubt as to the con-
struction of the terms of the trust deed, the trustee should be
instructed to apply to the court for protective advice.
Trust deeds covering a large issue of bonds are long and
involved instruments running from fifty to several hundred
pages. The entire instrument should be studied, but particular
attention must be given to ihe articles of the indenture en-
titled "provisions relating to redemption of bonds" and "'de-
feasance."
C. JUDGMENT LIENS
In most states statutes provide that judgment will be a lien
upon all non-exempt property of the judgment debtor for a
specified period of years. Since these liens are wholly statu-
50 When the trust instrument specifically and clearly defines the powers of the
trustee, there can exist no possible field for the exercise of discretion on the part of
the trustee, touching the powers he is permitted to exercise. Such powers, being
specifically defined, are necessarily fixed and inflexible. Conover v. Guarantee Trust
Co., 88 N.J. Eq. 450, 102 AtI. 844 (Ch. 1918), aff'd, 89 N.J. Eq. 584, 106 At. 890
(Ct. Err. & App. 1919).
51 Where collecting trustee for holders of bonds secured by mortgage received
and retained portion of proceeds of mortgaged property without informing bond-
holders or making distribution to them and without mortgagor demanding sur-
render of bonds, subsequent purchaser of mortgaged property subject to outstanding
indebtedness held not entitled to have amount of such proceeds credited on mort--
gaged indebtedness, as against claims of innocent bondholders. First Trust Co. v.
Danielson, 132 Neb. 141, 270 N.W. 680 (1937).
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tory, the conditions and limitations imposed by the statutes
are controlling and the lein commences either from the date
of rendition or from the date of docketing, depending upon
the wording of the particular statute. Except in a very few
states a judgment attaches as a lien without the use of any
process, but in Illinois and Michigan the judgment is ineffec-
tive unless followed by levy and execution.52 The statutes of
the various states authorize the transcribing of a judgment
from one county to another for the purpose of binding the
lands of the judgment debtor in the latter county.53
When a judgment has once attached to land it remains until
legally removed, and any purchaser who has actual or con-
structive notice of the judgment will take the property sub-
ject to the lien.54 Also, a judgment against a debtor during his
life will continue against the lands in the hands of heirs or
devisees and should be noted as outstanding in the title re-
port.55
Judgments which have been extinguished by lapse of time
may be disregarded and no mention need be made of them
unless the running of the statute has been suspended by an
absence in the military service of the United States.56 Judg-
52 The various state statutes and decisions showing when the judgment attaches
are set out in PATTON, TITLES § 315, n. 127 (1938).
53 Weadon v. Shahen, 50 Cal. App.2d 254, 123 P.2d 88 (1942); Chadwick v.
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank, 103 Ind. App. 224, 6 N.E.2d 741 (1937); Texas
Building & Mortgage Co. v. Morris, 123 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
54 Unless an outstanding judgment lien is released, the title will be unmarketable
and any purchaser will be justified in refusing the title. Harding v. Olson, 177 Ill.
298, 52 N.E. 482 (1898).
55 When a creditor has a judgment lien against interest of one joint tenant he
can immediately execute and sell interest of judgment debtor and thus sever the
joint tenancy, or he can keep his lien alive and wait until joint tenancy is terminated
by death of one of joint tenants, and if judgment debtor survives, judgment lien
immediately attaches to entire property, but, if judgment debtor is first to die, the
lien is lost. Zeigler v. Bonnell, 52 Cal. App.2d 217, 126 P.2d 118 (1942). A judgment
which is a lien against real estate owned by a decedent at the time of his death con-
tinues to bind said real estate without an action to revive. Simmons v. Simmons,
150 Pa. Super. 393, 28 A.2d 445 (1942), aff'd, 346 Pa. 52, 29 A.2d 677 (1943).
56 The period of military service shall not be included in computing any period
now or hereafter to be limited by any law, regulation, or order for the bringing of
any action or proceeding in any court, board, bureau, commission, department, or
other agency of government by or against any person in military service or by or
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ment searches should cover a period commencing ten years
prior to the date of certification of any abstract to which they
are attached or of which they form a part (except as the dura-
tion period is different in a particular state), and should relate
to the name 'of every record owner of any interest in the
property since that date.57
Execution in Illinois. - In Illinois a judgment lien con-
tinues for one year, but if an execution is issued within the
first year, the judgment will remain a lien for seven years.58
When execution is not issued on a judgment within one year
from the time the same becomes alien, it shall thereafter cease
to be a lien, but execution may issue upon such judgment at
any time within said seven years, and shall become a lien on
such real estate from the time it shall be delivered to the
sheriff or other proper officer to be executed."
The cases indicate that if one year has elapsed from the
date of the judgment without issuance of the execution, or if
seven years have elapsed .where an execution is issued within
one year, then the judgment is barred unless an execution is
outstanding at the expiration of the seven-year period. Such
an execution expires 90 days from its date; and thereafter the
judgment ceases to be a lien.
The execution will be effective from the time that it is
placed in the hands of the sheriff, and ordinarily the abstract-
against his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, whether such cause of action
or the right or privilege to institute such action or proceedings shall have accrued
prior to or during the period of such service, nor shall any part of such period which
occurs after the date of enactment of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
Amendments of 1942 be included in computing any period now or hereafter provided
by any law for the redemption of real property sold or forfeited to enforce any
obligation, tax or assessment. 54 STAT. 1180, 50 U.S.C. App. §525 (1942).
57 Though docketing of judgment is not notice to those subsequently dealing
with judgment debtor, judgment lien attaches to debtor's realty at time of docketing,
and since subsequent conveyance by judgment debtor does not defeat the lien, pur-
chasers of debtor's realty must search the record for judgments against debtor at
their peril. Gehrke Sheet Metal Works v. Mahl, 237 Wis. 414, 297 N.W. 373 (1941).
58 Unless an execution is issued, the lien of a money decree expires after one
year from its date. Thomas v. Van Meter, 164 Ill. 304, 45 N.E. 405 (1896).
59 ILL. ANx. STAT. c. 77, §§ 1-8 -(1935).
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er would have no record notice of this act. Therefore, all
judgments in the State of Illinois that are not more than one
year old should be released. However, if the judgment is more
than one year old and there has been no appeal or stay, then
it appears to the writer that the transaction may be com-
pleted if no execution is issued and in the hands of the sheriff,
since in the latter case the judgment becomes a lien only from
the time of the execution."
Homestead Exemption. - The law of judgments results
from and depends upon the right to apply real estate of the
judgment debtor to the satisfaction of the debt. In states
where the homestead is exempt from execution by statute, the
property, as long as it retains its homestead character, may be
transferred clear from all judgment liens without furnishing
any opportunity for such liens to attach.6 As a judgment is
not a lien on a homestead it follows that if property by aband-
onment or otherwise loses its homestead character, prior
judgments will attach to the property. 2 If a judgment once
attaches to property, which is not the homestead of the judg-
ment debtor, but thereafter becomes the homestead of the
judgment debtor, it will be encumbered by the judgment lien
upon which execution may issue.63 Where the defendant was
a resident of Minnesota when the judgment was entered and
docketed, and at that time owned certain property located in
60 In re Schuneman, 290 Fed. 200 (7th Cir. 1923).
61 Upon the death of owner using and occupying property as homestead, leaving
a surviving wife, his heirs or devisees took his homestead free from all debts
except for the purchase price, taxes and improvements, and death of surviving wife
or others who had right to occupy homesteat did not give general creditors any
right to subject homestead to payment of debts. Robinson v. Snyder Nat. Bank, 175
S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). See collected cases in Decennial Digests, Home-
stead Key 144.
62 Where declaration of homestead was filed first, and judgments were filed
second, and mortgage was executed third, under Washington law the judgment
creditors did not hold or have a lien on homestead property at time of execution of
mortgage. WASH. REV. CODE § 6.12.100 (1951). In re Shelton, 102 F. Supp. 629
(W.D. Wash. 1952).
63 A duly recorded judgment lien against the owner of land which is exempt as
homestead will nevertheless attach to the land when it ceases to be a homestead, if
it is then still owned by the judgment debtor. Walton v. Stinson, 140 S.W.2d 497
(Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
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Wisconsin, which he occupied as his homestead subsequent to
the date of the rendition of the judgment, but not prior there-
to, the court held that the property was not exempt since the
judgment lien having once attached to the property, there-
after always remains. 4
Release by Proper Parties. - Whenever a judgment is re-
leased by a stranger who states that he is an assignee of the
judgment creditor, the abstract should be amended to show
the assignment. 5 If a judgment is outstanding in favor of an
estate, the release should be executed by the personal repre-
sentative66 if he is still qualified (evidence of his appointment
and qualification should be shown) or the judgment should
be released by the person or persons to whom it was dis-
tributed in the estate, and evidence should be furnished from
the probate proceedings showing that the proper parties
executed the release. In situations where judgments are re-
leased by receivers of insolvent banks, the abstract should be
amended to show the appointment and qualification of the
receiver and that he was so acting at the time of the release.
Judgments Against Beneficial Interests. - It is a general
principle that the lien of a judgment is limited to the actual
interest the debtor has in the property and does not extend to
his apparent interest. The lien of a judgment does not attach
64 Upman v. Second Ward Bank, 15 Wis. 449 (1870).
05 Where amount of judgment and costs are paid by one who is a stranger to
the action, judgment is extinguished or not according to intention of party paying.
Hughes v. McElwee, 117 W.Va. 410, 185 S.E. 688 (1936).
6 Administratrix, upon her appointment as such, was vested with legal capacity
to sue for wrongful death of her decedent and payment to her as administratrix in
satisfaction of judgment would discharge and be a complete protection to judgment-
debtor, regardless of whether administratrix was in fact the lawful widow of deced-
ent or obtained appointment as administratrix by false representation as to such
relationship. Metropolitan Distributors v. Hyndsman, 201 Misc. 1045, 108 N.Y.S.2d
544 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 786, 109 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
67 Defendent, against whom judgment was rendered for damage to realty which
plaintiff claimed as widow of record owner, was entitled to require of personal
representative of estate of record owner or distributees of the realty in the estate a
-release or other evidence that widow was entitled to entire judgment. Ludlow v.
Colorado Animal By-Products Co., 104 Utah 221, 137 P.2d 347 (1943). See collected
cases in Decennial Digests, judgment Key 874(1).
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to the mere legal title of land existing to the judgment debtor
when the equitable and beneficial title is in another. 8 The lien
of a judgment attaches to the precise interest of the judgment
debtor of the land. In some states it is confined to the legal
interest of the debtor; but whether it extends to the legal and
equitable interest or is restricted to the legal interest only, it
is the actual and not the apparent interest of the defendant
that is affected, and his apparent interest can neither extend
nor restrict the operation of the lien so that it shall encumber
any greater or less interest than the debtor in fact possesses.69
The interest of a vendor in lands contracted to be sold is
bound by the lien of a judgment recovered against him while
the contract is unexecuted to the extent to which it is un-
executed. The lien of a judgment against a vendor may be
enforced against a vendee with notice as to all sums remaining
unpaid by the vendee under the contract, but the judgment
creditor must take proper care to notify a vendee in possession
of his judgment, and must take the proper steps to subject the
amount due from the vendee in possession to the payment of
his judgment. Hence it is apparent that the legal estate may
68 Judgment creditor of husband could not satisfy judgment out of property
standing in husband's name but which was subject to trust in favor of wife. Mauri-
cau v. Haugen, 387 fl. 186, 56 N.E.2d 367 (1944). A judgment taken upon individ-
ual debt against holder of a mere legal title held in trust for another has no lien
upon land so held. Jackson v. Thompson, 214 N.C. 539, 200 S.E. 16 (1938). Where
judgment debtor held merely naked legal title to land under unrecorded deed and
equitable and beneficial title thereto was in judgment debtor's wife, lien of judgment
would not attach to land. N.D. Rav. CODE §§ 28-2013, 47-1941 (1943). Redman v.
Biewer, 78 N.D. 120, 48 N.W.2d 372 (1951). A judgment creditor of a trust com-
pany could not secure a lien on realty held by the trust company as trustee for
others, since a judgment is a lien against only that realty in which the judgment
debtor has a beneficial interest. Davis v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 335 Pa. 387, 7
A.2d 3 (1939). See collected cases in Decennial Digests, Judgment Key 780(5).
69 A judgment lien does not attach to the mere record title of land standing in
the name of the judgment debtor, but is limited to the actual interest that the
judgment debtor had in the land at the time the judgment lien attached. Harry v.
Hertzler, 185 Okla. 151, 90 P.2d 656 (1939). Under statute providing that every
judgment for money shall be lien on all realty to which defendant in judgment is or
becomes possessed or entitled at or after date of judgment, apparent interest of
debtor can neither extend nor restrict operation of lien so that it shall incumber any
greater or less interest that debtor in fact possesses. Guaranty Co. of Maryland v.
Hubbard, 117 W.Va. 563, 187 S.E. 313 (1936) ; Musa v. Segelke & Kohlhaus Co., 224
Wis. 432, 272 N.W. 657 (1937).
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be bound by a judgment against one, such as a vendor, and
the equitable estate by a judgment against another, such as
a vendee, and that the interest of either may be transferred to
a purchaser at a sheriff's sale.7"
From the foregoing, it would appear that judgment docket-
ed on property previously sold under a land contract would
become a lien on the property sold to the extent of the ven-
dor's interest. If the purchase money has been paid and the
sale consummated, except for the execution of the deed, the
lien of the judgment rendered against the vendor does not
attach to the land for he has no beneficial interest therein, but
merely a bare legal title. The conclusion would seem to be
that a judgment extends to whatever title a judgment debtor
owns, whether a fee or less than a fee and whether legal or
equitable. Therefore, the certificate of the abstracter should
cover land contract vendors and land contract vendees, to-
gether with the names of all parties holding equitable inter-
ests in the property.
Release by Attorneys. - As a general rule, any attorney
who is retained by a client is authorized to do anything that
may be necessary from the time he begins the proceedings
until he has obtained a judgment. However, his authority ex-
tends beyond this and also includes the power to collect the
money found due to his client and to satisfy the judgment.7
The attorney, however, may not compromise the claim and is
not permitted to receive less than the full amount called for
70 A judgment lien accruing against a vendor after making a contract of sale, but
before making delivery of deed, extends to all of vendor's interest remaining in land,
Chain O'Mines v. Williamson, 101 Colo. 231, 72 P.2d 265 (1937). Where judgment
debtors had entered into a valid contract for sale of real property prior to entry of
judgment, lien of such judgment was enforceable by judgment creditor against
vendees with notice as to all sums remaining unpaid by vendees upon the contract,
and debtors could not destroy the lien by assigning or quitclaiming their interest in
the contract and real property to a third party after entry of the judgment. Heath v.
Dodson, 7 Wash.2d 667, 110 P.2d 845 (1941). See collected cases in Decennial
Digests, judgment Key 780(3).
71 An attorney may receive moneys due his client on a judgment and may satisfy
the judgment. State v. Hialeah, 130 Fla. 375, 177 So. 712 (1937). See collected cases
in Decennial Digests, Attorney & Client Key 100.
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by the judgment.72 In addition, if the attorney satisfies the
judgment for less than the original amount, the parties would
not be protected in relying on such a satisfaction. An attorney
who has recovered judgment has the authority to bind his
client by receiving payment of the judgment and satisfying it,
unless the defendant has notice or knowledge of the lack of
such authority.73
A judgment lien may be released by the judgment creditor
on the docket or by an instrument of release duly acknowl-
edged and filed for record. Often in our major cities the satis-
faction of a judgment is entered upon the docket by the
attorney who appeared for the plaintiff in obtaining the judg-
ment. If the attorney was not the attorney in the original
action, then the release by the attorney must be under a separ-
ate power of the attorney. If no power of attorney is shown
in the abstract, the abstracter should be requested to amend
the entry setting out the judgment by naming such attorney,
and if it subsequently appears that the attorney releasing the
judgment was not the attorney in the original action, a new
release should be executed by the judgment creditor. It is to
be noted that the statutes sometimes limit the time during
which the attorney in the original action can release the judg-
ment and any release by an attorney made more than five
years after the date of the judgment should be checked with
the statutes of the particular state.
If the attorney's client dies after the judgment has been
entered, the relationship of attorney and client terminates,
72 In statute providing that an attorney has power to receive money claimed by
client and upon payment thereof and not otherwise to discharge the claim or
acknowledge satisfaction of judgment, the word "payment" means, not payment in
part, but payment in full. Glenwood Lumber & Coal Co. v. Hammers, 226 Iowa 788,
285 N.W. 277 (1939); Farmer v. Schneider, 269 App. Div. 1043, 58 N.Y.S.2d 587
(Sup. Ct. 1945); Business Service Collection Bureau v. Yegen, 67 N.D. 51, 269 N.W.
46 (1936).
73 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client § 99 (1937). After notice of substitution of at-
torneys has been given, a payment to plaintiff's first attorney, who recovered the
judgment, cannot operate as a valid payment on the judgment. Nuessler v. Bergman,
141 Wash. 297, 251 Pac. 578 (1926).
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and the attorney has no further power to release the judg-
ment. As a matter of law, a satisfaction given by the attorney
after the death of the client is of no force and effect. In the
usual case, the attorney alone may completely satisfy the
judgment if the client is still living and sane and is the owner
of the judgment, provided, however, that the attorney still
represents the client and full payment in money has been
made. If the judgment creditor has assigned a judgment, the
attorney has no further power to release it, and the relation-
ship of attorney and client is no longer effective. In any such
case, the privity between the judgment creditor and the at-
torney who represented him is destroyed.
Identity of Debtors. - There is a presumption that names
spelled differently refer to the same persons when they sound
alike, but there is too much doubt and uncertainty in the de-
cisions for any attorney to pass on matters of this sort with-
out a reference to the decisions in the particular jurisdiction.
There are decisions to the effect that the names of Hendrix
and Hendricks,74 Bernhard and Bernhand,75 Leboeuf and
Leboub,76 refer to the same persons while the names of Gen-
ero and Geneva77 do not refer to the same persons. The at-
torney, in passing discrepancies in a name of this sort, should
confine himself to instances which are so clearly within the
rule that there is very little likelihood that a court or a sub-
sequent attorney will take a different view of the matter. In
any situation where there is a wrong middle name, or where
initials only are used, in naming the judgment debtor, it ap-
pears that the safest course is to call for a release of the judg-
ment or to give the parties the option of furnishing an affidavit
executed by the judgment creditor, if in fact the party is not
the judgment debtor. If the abstract reveals a judgment
74 Hendrix v. State, 21 Ala. App. 517, 110 So. 167 (1926), cert. denied, 215 Ala.
114, 110 So. 168 (1926). See collected cases in Decennial Digests, Names Key 16(2).
75 Bernhand v. Ennis, 140 Ati. 151 (Super. Ct. 1927).
76 LeBoeuf v. Papp, 243 Mich. 318, 220 N.W. 792 (1928).
77 Geneva v. Thompson, 200 Iowa 1173, 206 N.W. 132 (1925).
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against B. McKenzie and the attorney represents a party who
is lending money on property owned by Ben McKenzie, a re-
quest should be made for the release of the judgment. If the
judgment is against C. C. Richardson but the grantor is Carrie
Richardson, it may be assumed that the judgment debtor is
not the same person as the owner, and if an affidavit to that
effect is furnished by the judgment creditor such evidence
may be accepted and the judgment may be disregarded. A
judgment against J. W. Humphrey was sufficient to place the
parties on inquiry as to whether the debtor was the same per-
son as the record titleholder, John W. Humphrey." As stated
above, there is too much doubt and confusion in the cases to
take a chance in these matters.79 Whenever names are as close
as the ones referred to herein, they are sufficiently similar to
afford constructive notice and the judgment should either be
satisfied or an affidavit should be furnished by the judgment
creditor that they are not in fact the same parties
Federal Tax Lien Judgments. - State exemption laws are
of no avail to the tax-debtor when the Federal Government
seeks to enforce its tax liens. Many of the mid-western and
western states have laws exempting homesteads from debt
enforcement processes, but several courts have held that the
federal tax lien attaches to the taxpayer's homestead as well
as to other state exempted property. The courts reason that,
in view of the paramount importance of tax revenues to the
central government, no state should have the power to place
the property of its citizens beyond the reach of the federal tax
collector."0
78 Penney v. Russell & Co., 52 Minn. 433, 54 N.W. 484 (1893). PATTON, TITLES
§ 316 (1938).
79 Breyer v. Gale, 53 N.D. 439, 207 N.W. 46 (1925); Coral Gables v. Kenl, 334
Pa. 441, 6 A.2d 275 (1939).
80 United States v. Heffron, 158 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. :947); Shambaugh v. Sco-
field, 132 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1943). The taxes due to the Federal government are not
a specific charge against homestead, but are a lien against whole of decedent's estate.
Federal tax lien attaches as of date assessment list is received in office of Collector
of Internal Revenue. INT. REV. CODE §§ 3670-3672. In re Capitol Cleaners & Dyers,
233 P.2d 377 (Utah 1951).
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Under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code,8' the
lien continues "until the liability ... is satisfied or becomes
unenforceable by reason of lapse of time." The pertinent sec-
tions of the Code,82 provide that a taxwhich has been assessed
may be "collected by distraint or by a proceeding in court,"
but only if (1) begun within six years after the assessment of
the tax, or (2) prior to the expiration of any period for col-
lection agreed upon in writing by the Commissioner and the
taxpayer before the expiration of such six-year period. Hence,
it can be seen that in order to preserve the life of the lien, the
Government within six years following the assessment of the
tax must take some action, which may consist of obtaining a
waiver from the taxpayer, instituting distraint proceedings, or
bringing a suit in court to collect the tax.83
An attorney examining title is in no position to judge
whether or not a federal tax lien has been barred in six years
since the Government may have obtained a waiver from the
taxpayer extending the time of expiration beyond that
period.84 In any such case, the examining attorney should in-
sist that the lien be satisfied or that the property be released
from the federal tax lien.
Turning now to the manner in which a tax lien must be
recorded to insure its priority over purchasers, pledgees, judg-
ment creditors and mortgagees, we find that there are two
controlling statutory provisions: First: If the property sub-
81 INT. R V. CODE § 3671.
82 Id. §§ 276(c), 3312.
83 The filing of government's claim for taxes with the administrator of debtors'
estate was a "proceeding in court?' within the section. United States v. First Nat.
Bank, 54 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ohio 1943). Where no proceeding was instituted for
the collection of income tax prior to the expiration of limitation period, regardless
of the fact that assessment was made prior to the expiration of such period, the
collection of the tax is barred. Russell v. United States, 278 U.S. 181 (1929).
84 Parties dealing with property of taxpayer against whom tax lien has been filed
are charged with notice of the recorded lien and with notice of the provisions of
statute continuing and extending time under certain conditions, and are bound to
know that if the lien has been discharged in whole or in part, a release must be filed
by the collector, and that the time within which collection may be made may be
extended by written agreement. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Moore, 29 F. Supp. 179
(E.D. III. 1939).
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ject to the lien is situated in a state or territory which has by
law authorized the filing of notices of federal tax liens in a
designated office, the lien must be filed in that office. Second:
If the particular state or territory has not by law authorized
the filing of the lien in a designated office, notice of the lien
must be filed in the office of the clerk of the United States dis-
trict court for the district in which the property subject to the
lien is situated, and the lien will attach to any property of the
debtor in any county included within the federal district.85
United States District Court Judgments. - In addition to
federal tax liens the attorney examining title to real property
must also be concerned with judgments docketed in the fed-
eral courts in favor of the United States86 or in favor of in-
dividuals or corporations. Such judgments are governed by
Section 1962 of the United States Code.
The federal statutes provide that judgments and decrees
rendered in a district court in the United States within any
state shall be liens on property throughout such state in the
same manner and to the same extent and under the same con-
ditions as if such judgments had been rendered by a court of
general jurisdiction of such state. Further, whenever the laws
of any state require a judgment to be recorded and docketed
or indexed in a particular manner before the lien shall attach,
these rules must be followed or conformed to, before the lien
shall attach in the courts of the state. The federal statutes
also provide that judgments and decrees in a United States
district court within any state shall cease to be a lien on real
estate, in the same manner and at like periods as judgments
85 INT. REV. CODE § 3672.
86 The United States may take the benefit of any state or federal statute though
it is not bound by its limitations. United States v. Minor, 235 Fed. 101 (4th Cir.
1916). Federal government could maintain action against builder for alleged viola-
tion of priorities regulations through failure to construct units to specifications
required of those charging maximum prices and could compel restitution of over-
charges to purchasers even though right of purchasers to restitution might be barred
by limitations. War Powers Act, 56 STAT. 176 (1942), 50 U.S.C. App. § 631 et seq.
(1946). United States v. Shaw Tenenbaum Const. Co., 9 F.R.D. 533 (W.D. Mo.
1949). See collected cases in Decennial Digests, Judgment Key 760.
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and decrees of the courts of such state cease by law to be a
lien thereon. 7
The majority of states have conformity statutes providing
that a judgment or decree in a district court of the United
States within the state shall be from the time of docketing
thereof in said court a lien upon the real property of the judg-
ment debtor located in the county in which it is so docketed
the same as a judgment of a state court. The state statutes
provide further that when the judgment is so transcribed and
docketed, it will attach in the same manner and with like
effect, as in the case of judgments and decrees of the state
courts.8" The search for judgments in federal courts need ex-
tend to the federal district court only; none will be found in
the Supreme Court or in the circuit court of appeals, since
these courts enforce their mandates through the district
courts."9
D. TAXES
The legislative power to classify property for taxation is
very broad, and generally speaking all real property not
8 B. A. Lott, Inc. v. Padgett, 153 Fla. 304, 14 So.2d 667 (1943). Under federal
and Illinois statutes, the same rights are accorded to a judgment entered in a United
States court sitting in Illinois as are associated to a judgment entered in an Illinois
state court, the lien as to each being created, extended and extinguished in precisely
the same manner. Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Maley, 125 F.2d 131 (7th Cir.
1942).
88 The following states have proper conformity statutes as contemplated by the
Act of August 1, 1888, REV. STAT. § 967, 28 U.S.C. § 1962 (Supp. 1952): Alabama,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. Certain other states either do not have conformity statutes, or have
statutes relating to liens of judgments of the Federal Courts which do not provide
sufficient conformity and in these states the lien of the federal judgment will attach
to any land of the judgment debtor included within the territorial jurisdiction of the
federal court. Congress did not intend to change the rule that federal court judg-
ments were liens on lands throughout the territorial jurisdiction of the respective
federal courts, except in those states which pass laws making the conditions of
creation, scope, and territorial application of liens of federal court judgments the
same as state court judgments. Rhea v. Smith, 274 U.S. 434 (1927).
89 PATTON, TITLES § 356 (1938).
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specifically exempted is subject to tax." Exemptions are
strictly construed, and the taxpayer has the burden of prov-
ing that he qualifies for exemption. Property belonging to
state or local governments generally is exempted by state
constitution or statute.91 It is the policy of law not to tax
public charities because they perform social and welfare ser-
vices that otherwise might have to be performed by the
state.92
Jurisdiction, Assessment, and Attachment of Lien. - Jur-
isdiction to tax is determined by the situs of the property, and
land can be taxed only by the state in which it is located.93
Likewise, a municipality or other taxing district cannot tax
land that lies outside its boundaries.94
The state can make the ownership of property subject to
taxation relate to any day or period of the year. Also, a state
legislature has almost unlimited authority to fix the amount
or rate of tax. Statutes customarily require that the assess-
ment be completed by a certain day or within a specified
period. 5 Most states require that property be assessed at its
90 Bonds v. State Dept. of Revenue, 254 Ala. 553, 49 So.2d 280 (1950) ; Helvey
v. Sax, App., 229 P.2d 796 (1951), subsequent opinion, 38 Cal.2d 21, 237 P.2d 269
(1951); Angeles v. Tannahill, 105 Cal. App.2d 541, 233 P.2d 671 (1951); Hassler v.
Engberg, 233 Minn. 487, 48 N.W.2d 343 (1951) ; Johnston v. Conner, 205 Okla. 233,
236 P.2d 987 (1951) ; State v. Byrnes, 219 S.C. 485, 66 S.E.2d 33 (1951).
91 Bronx Garment Center v. New York City, Dept. of Finance, 199 Misc. 513,
106 N.Y.S.2d 720 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 280 App. Div. 890, 115 N.Y.S.2d 524 (ist
Dep't 1952). No tax can be laid, except by authority of the Legislature and it may
grant exemptions, either in express terms or by omitting certain property from the
catalogue of taxable estate. City of Keene v. Town of Roxbury, 97 N.H. 82, 81 A.2d
439 (1951). Right of legislature to exempt property of subordinate branches of
government from taxation is necessary adjunct of right to tax. Eugene v. Keeney,
134 Ore. 393, 293 Pac. 924 (1930).
92 In re Downer's Estate, 101 Vt. 167, 142 AtI. 78 (1928).
93 Senior v. Braden, 295 U.S. 422 (1935).
94 Township or borough school district cannot tax that part of tract of land
which lies outside its boundaries, unless dividing line is also a county line, and the
mansion house on the tract lies within the district attempting to tax. Arthur v.
School District, 164 Pa. 410, 30 At]. 299 (1894).
95 Assessment of entire land in name of plaintiff, conveying part thereof to an-
other subsequent to date when assessor was required to examine titles, held valid.
Avery v. Mayo, 161 La. 699, 109 So. 393 (1926). Record owner of premises held
property assessed for taxes, though owner had conveyed premises by an unrecorded
deed. Saftel v. Newton Sav. Bank, 254 Mass. 516, 150 N.E. 433 (1926).
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full value, but assessors frequently value property at a frac-
tion of its true value." Even in states where the laws provide
that the property be valued at a specific fraction of its true
value, assessors frequently value property at percentages
lower than those specified.
The statutes as a rule fix the time when the tax lien at-
taches. A provision which creates a tax lien before determina-
tion of the amount of tax is valid." If there is no statutory
provision, the lien has been held to attach (1) when the
amount of tax becomes fixed and liability for payment ac-
crues;" (2) from levy date;"9 or (3) from completion of
assessment.'00
Many statutes give tax liens priority over other liens at-
taching to taxpayers' property.' The question of priority is
one of legislative intent, so that the answer as to whether the
legislature made the tax lien paramount depends upon con-
struction of the particular statute.'0 2 In any event, a statutory
96 "Assess" when used in connection with taxation of property, means to make
a valuation and appraisal of property, usually in connecting with listing of property
liable to taxation, and implies the exercise of discretion on the part of officials
charged with duty of assessing, including the listing of inventory of property in-
volved, determination of extent of physical property, and placing of a value thereon.
Montana-Dakota Power Co. v. Weeks, 8 F. Supp. 935 (D.N.D. 1934).
97 United States v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 274 (1941).
9s Lien attaches when tax becomes due. Larson v. Hamilton County, 123 Iowa
485, 99 N.W. 133 (1904). Taxes accruing against land involved became lien from
date they accrued. J. M. Jones Lumber Co. v. Homochitto Development Co., 163
Miss. 305, 141 So. 589 (1932) ; Bean v. Munger Land Co., 265 S.W. 844 (Mo. App.
1924).
99 Tax lien of state does not become fixed encumbrance until amount of tax is
determined by annual assessment of land and annual levy of tax. McAnally v. Little
River Drainage Dist., 325 Mo. 348, 28 S.W.2d 650 (1930); Henderson Bldg. & Loan
Iss'n v. Burwell, 206 N.C. 358, 174 S.E. 125 (1934).
100 Eaton v. Chesebrough, 82 Mich. 214, 46 N.W. 365 (1890).
101 A tax lien is paramount to all rights, titles, claims, or interests whenever or
however acquired. Jader v. Costello, 405 lI. 181, 89 N.E.2d 814 (1950). Taxes upon
real property are a perpetual, paramount lien thereon against all persons except the
United States and the State of North Dakota. N.D. Rxv. CODE § 57-0240 (1943).
Conlin v. Metzger, 77 N.D. 620, 44 N.W.2d 617 (1950). See collected cases in De-
cennial Digets, Taxation Key 509.
102 Missouri v. Ross, 299 U.S. 72 (1936); Bolton v. Terra Bella Irr. Dist., 106
Cal. App. 313, 289 Pac. 678 (1930).
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declaration of priority must not impair existing contracts or
vested rights."0 3
A transfer of property subject to a tax lien ordinarily will
not divest the lien, even to a purchaser for value without no-
tice.' Thus, an assignment for benefit of creditors0 5 or a
transfer of property to a trustee in bankruptcy..6 will not
wipe out the tax lien. Unless the statute provides otherwise,
a tax lien attaches to property until the tax is paid. 7 Gen-
erally however, duration of the lien is fixed by statute.'
103 A tax lien, in absence of statute, ranks according to order of attachment to
land in same manner as other liens. However, the legislature has power to determine
whether or not a tax lien shall be superior to other liens, providing determination
does not impair existing contracts or vested rights. Steinfeld v. State, 37 Ariz. 389,
294 Pac. 834 (1930). Legislature has power to make taxes a lien on all property of
owner of taxed property prior to other liens. To constitute a tax against all property
of owner at date of levy superior to liens already existing, legislative intent must
appear either expressly or by necessary implication. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v.
Black, 67 Utah 268, 247 Pac. 486 (1926).
104 Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Harden, 137 Ind. 486, 37 N.E. 324 (1894).
No one can be innocent purchaser of land as against lien held by state for taxes due.
Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Bankers' Life Co., 43 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
The lien of city of third class for taxes on property within city limits on January 1,
is inchoate and becomes fixed in amount by relation back to such date after assess-
ment and levy is completed. Long v. City of Independence, 360 Mo. 620, 229
S.W.2d 686 (1950). Where order of board of county commissioners correction
assessment of ad valorem taxes on realty was invalid, taxes paid by subsequent pur-
chaser constituted a lien on property which was an incumbrance running with land
and its discharge was legal duty of vendors by terms of their conveyance to pur-
chaser's vendor whereby they warranted premises unincumbered of and free from
all taxes. Shires v. Reynolds, 203 Okla. 573, 224 P.2d 580 (1950). See collected cases
in Decennial Digests, Taxation Key 511.
105 Exum v. Baker, 115 N.C. 242, 20 S.E. 448 (1894). State has perpetual lien
on all taxable lands within its limits, which cannot be divested through changes in
ownership. Elmhurst State Bank v. Stone, 346 Ill. 157, 178 N.E. 362 (1931).
106 Stokes v. State, 46 Ga. 412 (1872).
107 Packard Contracting Co. v. Robers, 70 Ariz. 411, 222 P.2d 791 (1950). An
original sale of lands for a delinquent tax is carried through all the proceedings so
that the lien thereof is preserved separately no matter how many subsequent tax
sales have been had. Conlin v. Metzger, 77 N.D. 620, 44 N.W.2d 617 (1950). Lien
impressed by law upon real estate for taxes due thereon continue until discharged
by payment of taxes or by redemption of tax sale certificate issued for nonpayment
of taxes, or as otherwise provided by law. Henderson v. Leatherman, 120 Fla. 496,
163 So. 310 (1935); Eschbach v. Pitts, 6 Md. 71 (1854). Lien of taxes regularly
levied on land is ordinarily perpetual. Flansburg v. Shumway, 117 Neb. 125, 219
N.W. 956 (1928). When a tract of land is assessed as an entirety in name of one or
more of the owners, a tenant in common may not pay his proportionate share and
thus discharge the lien of the state on his undivided interest, and lien of state on
entire tract continues until all taxes assessed are paid. Haden v. Eaves, 55 N.M. 40,
226 P.2d 457 (1950). See collected cases in Decennial Digests, Taxation Key 513.
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Special Assessments. - Special assessments rest upon the
taxing power. 9 but differ from general taxes in that they -do
not affect all lands within a subdivision generally but relate
to special properties that receive benefits from a specific im-
provement."' The property affected and the existence of a
lien depend upon the enactment of the legislature."' Usually
all assessments become a lien after they are certified to the
auditor and put on the tax duplicate.
Drainage assessments on farm property, and special assess-
ments for paving, street lighting, and sewerage on city lots
are liens on. the particular parcels involved." 2 These special
assessments usually extend over a period from five to ten
years from the time they are assessed. Arrangements for the
payment or nonpayment of all unmatured instalments are
108 -Duration of lien is dependent upon legislature. Burnet v. Dean, 60 N.J. Eq.
9,46 At]. 532 (Ch. 1900).
109 "Taxes" include special or local assessments on specific property benefited
by improvements, and drainage taxes come within that definition. Waits v. Black
Bayou Drainage Dist., 186 Miss. 270, 185 So. 577 (1939).
110 Department of Public Sanitation v. Solan, 229 Ind. 228, 97 N.E.2d 495
(1951); It re Shurtz's Will, 242 Iowa 448, 46 N.W.2d 559 (1951). While, in gcneral
sense, word "taxes" includes "special assessment," yet clear distinction exists between
the two; "special assessment" being peculiar class of taxes which are levied on
property benefited according to some equitable rule, while "taxes," as generally
understood, is money necessary to defray expenses of government. Harlan County v.
Thompson, 125 Neb. 65, 248 N.W. 801 (1933). Assessment for drainage work could
not be made against land which was not benefited. Stoltz v. Water Power and Con-
trol Commission, 258 App. Div. 440, 17 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1940), appeal denied, 259
App. Div. 777, 18 N.Y.S.2d 750 (3rd Dep't 1940); Rupp v. Tulsa, 202 Okla. 442,
214 P.2d 913 (1950). See collected cases in Decennial Digests, Municipal Corps. Key
405.
"ll Under statutes relating to drainage districts, land within a district cannot
be assessed for any greater amount than is necessary to pay costs of the improve-
ment. IowA CoDE §§ 7479, 7484, 7505-7509 (1939). Ames v. Board of Supervisors,
234 Iowa 617, 12 N.W.2d 567 (1944). Land that is benefited by proposed drainage
ditch may be assessed for payment for construction of the ditch regardless of
whether it abuts the line of the ditch. CoMP. ST. 1929, § 31-109. Loup River Public
Power Dist. v. Platte County, 141 Neb. 29, 2 N.W.2d 609 (1942). Under Oklahoma
law, unless an easement gives the exclusive right to possession and control thereof,
it is not subject to special benefit drainage district assessments. Sinclair Refining Co.
v. Burroughs, 133 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. Okla. 1943). See collected cases in Decennial
Digests, Drains Key 69.
112 State lands may be assessed for drainage and the lien for drainage taxes may
be made of equal dignity with the lien for state and county taxes. FLA. STAT. c. 298
§ 1530(1) el seq. (1951). State v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 155 Fla. 403, 20 So.2d
397 (1945).
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usually made between the parties at the time the property is
conveyed or whenever a mortgage is placed upon the property.
In the majority of mortgage cases the general custom is to
insist on payment of all delinquent instalments and to waive
present payment of unmatured instalments. This rule may be
varied by agreement between the parties, but all delinquent
special assessments should be paid before the property is
mortgaged.
Separate Assessment of Parcels. - If A is the owner of lots
3 and 4 and the lots are being assessed together for purposes
of taxation and A subsequently sells lot 4 to B, it will be
necessary to call for separate assessment for tax purposes on
the next tax roll. This would also be true in the case of a sale
of farm property where a quarter section is being divided in
half. If the attorney does not call for separation, then either of
the parties may subsequently pay the other's taxes and it may
later be necessary to start an action for recovery. Therefore,
if the final continuation in an abstract covers more land than
is to be included in a certain mortgage or conveyance, a state-
ment by the abstracter to the effect "that this property is
assessed separately" is insufficient and the attorney should
direct that the premises to be mortgaged or sold be separately
assessed on the next tax roll.
In the usual case, if a person makes a mistake and pays
taxes on property which he does not own the courts hold that
the payment was "voluntary" and cannot be regained."'
However, this rule has been varied in Wisconsin" 4 and a per-
son paying taxes on a parcel that he does not own is entitled
to reimbursement. As an inference from the rules set forth in
113 Landowner and predecessors in interest who paid taxes erroneously assessed
against them on strip of land in honest but mistaken belief that they owned strip,
which of record belonged to adjoining land owner without whose request or knowl-'
edge taxes were paid, held "volunteers", and not entitled to reimbursement for all
such taxes from adjoining land owner. McMillan v. O'Brien, 219 Cal. 775, 29 P.2d
183 (1934).
114 Central Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Swenson, 222 Wis. 331, 267 N.W. 307 (1936).
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this decision, it is not only necessary to know that the taxes
are paid, but the taxes must have been paid by the owner of
the property. Since taxes are often paid by agents, real estate
firms, trustees and other parties acting for the owners, this has
caused some difficulty, but it would appear that the matter
can be ignored by attorneys, except in situations where the
examination covers valuable commercial properties or other
properties which may be valuable by reason of location or for
aesthetic reasons.
Delinquent Taxes. - Some states collect taxes by selling
certificates of deliquency covering overdue taxes to any appli-
cant willing to pay their principal value, plus interest."' Cer-
tificates can also be issued to the county on property for
which no prior certificate has been issued." 6 The certificate
does not give holder title to property or any interest in land;
it merely gives him a lien on the property for the amount paid,
plus interest." 7 To preserve his rights, the holder must
pay taxes subsequently accruing, until foreclosure of the cer-
tificate.1 8 Statutes provide for foreclosure of delinquency
certificates by a proceeding against the property" 9 and these
requirements must be followed closely. 2 ° As a condition pre-
cedent, a statute can require holder of a delinquency certifi-
cate to pay all taxes due and unpaid before applying for fore-
closure.'21
Parties Allowed to Purchase. - Generally, only strangers
to the title may purchase tax certificates, and it is customary
115 State ex rel. American Savings Union v. Whittlesey, 17 Wash. 447, S0 Pac.
119 (1897).
116 Gordon v. Adams, 125 Ore. 662, 268 Pac. 60 (1928).
117 Delinquency certificate, evidencing general tax liens, vests in holder no more
than lien on property securing amount paid and interest. Kienbaum v. New Republic
Co., 139 Wash. 298, 246 Pac. 925 (1926).
118 Whatcom County v. Black, 90 Wash. 280, 155 Pac. 1071 (1916).
119 The foreclosure of a delinquency certificate is a proceeding in rem, and is
operative to convey all the title that either the owner or the state possessed at the
time of sale. Connor v. Spokane County, 96 Wash. 8, 164 Pac. 517 (1917).
120 Rae v. Morgan, 125 Ore 644, 266 Pac. 1069, 267 Pac. 1072 (1928).
121 Trumbull v. Bruce, 64 Wash. 644, 117 Pac. 472 (1911). Tax certificate ob-
tained in 1932 was void when purchaser paid only taxes for 1928, and taxes for
other years were then due. Warrior v. Stith, 174 Okla. 150, 50 P.2d 179 (1935).
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to require that the officer conducting the sale give the pur-
chaser a tax sale certificate. This certificate constitutes written
evidence of the purchaser's lien on the property until expira-
tion of the redemption period.'22 The holder is entitled to a
tax deed passing title after the redemption period has ex-
pired.'23 The tax certificate also constitutes constructive no-
tice of the sale to a later buyer of the property.
Ordinarily, a person obliged to pay the taxes on a parcel of
realty cannot purchase the parcel at a tax sale.'24 If he does,
it is deemed to be merely a means of paying the taxes, and
does not in any way strengthen his title to the property.
Parties Allowed to Redeem. - The statutes commonly
give a delinquent taxpayer the right to redeem his land sold
at a tax sale. Generally, any person may redeem who has an
interest in the property that would be affected by the vesting
of title in the tax sale purchaser.'25 The redemption privilege
122 Tax certificate imports a paramount right to the land, subject only to the
right to redeem, and constitute a cloud on the title. Curtis Land & Loan Co. v
Interior Land Co., 137 Wis. 341, 118 N.W. 853 (1908).
123 Where only life tenant was made party to judicial proceeding to foreclose
tax sale certificate, and remaindermen were not before court, a sale of land pursuant
to such proceeding did not pass the interest of the remaindermen as well as of the
life estate to the purchaser, and sale and commissioner's deed conveyed to purchaser
only the life estate. N.C. GE. STAT. § 105-410 (1950). Eason v. Spence, 232 N.C.
579, 61 S.E.2d 717 (1950). Tax title is a new independent title, and it has nothing
to do with previous chain of title nor does it in any way connect itself with it, for
it is a breaking up of all previous titles. Adams v. Nibbor Realty Co., 93 N.E.2d
727 (Ohio App. 1950). Tax sale certificates do not entitle owner to possession of
land covered thereby. They are only evidence entitling owner to deed on happening
of certain conditions. Hastings v. Montgomery, 142 Okla. 47, 285 Pac. 89 (1930).
Until purchaser of realty at tax sale made application to county treasurer for tax
leed, owner of realty had right of redemption, and purchaser had only a lien for all
mounts paid plus legal rate of interest. OxLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 433e (1951). Ken-
worthy v. Murphy, 204 Okla. 233, 228 P.2d 382 (1951). See collected cases in Decen-
nial Digests, Taxation Key 730.
124 Larson v. Whitmer, 124 Mont. 399, 224 P.2d 983 (1950). One who, by virtue
of an existing legal or contractual relation with another is under an obligation to
such a person to pay the taxes on lands, but who omits to pay such taxes, cannot be
allowed to strengthen his title to such land by buying in tax title when property is
sold as a consequence of his omission to pay taxes on it, and his purchase at sale
will operate merely as a payment of taxes and title will be same as it was before sale
except that lien for taxes is discharged. Morris v. Lambert, 218 S.C. 384, 62 S.E.2d
841 (1950). See collected cases in Decennial Digests, Taxation Key 674.
125 Mortgagee held entitled to redeem portion of lands covered by mortgage,
thoug, lands sought to be redeemed had not been assessed separately. State v. Hays,
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ordinarily must be exercised within the time limit fixed by the
statute. However, redemption usually may be had after the
redemption period expires, provided equitable grounds exist
therefor. Statutes customarily provide for notice to the owner,
and strict compliance with the statutory terms is necessary.'26
The amount required to redeem is controlled by statute,
but usually includes: (1) the amount paid by purchaser at
the sale, 27 (2) subsequent taxes paid by purchaser, 2 ' and
(3) interest,'29 penalties 3 and expenses' 3' prescribed by
statute.
86 Mont. 58, 282 Pac. 32 (1929). Mortgage foreclosure purchaser has same rights of
redemption of property sold for taxes as prior owners of property. Fuchs v. Syndi-
cate Realty Co., 107 N.J. Eq. 506, 153 AUt. 584 (Ct. Err. & App. 1931). Assignee of
mortgage, in matter of redeeming from tax sale, has rights of mortgagee. Dunkum v.
Maceck Bldg. Corp., 256 N.Y. 275, 176 N.E. 392 (1931), affirming, 227 App. Div.
230, 237 N.Y. Supp. 180 (2d Dep't 1929). Equitable owners, as well as record
owner, may redeem property from tax sale. Burnett v. McGrath, 146 Okla. 83, 293
Pac. 1102 (1930). One who established only that he was in possession at time of tax
sale and not that he was owner of the land at such time did 'ot acquire right to
redeem the property by virtue of his claim of adverse possession for period of over
five years before the sale. Txx. Rxv. Civ. STAT. Awr. art. 5509, 7341, 7345(b)
(1954). Hughes v. Price, 229 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950). Stockholder and
trustee in two corporations, one of which owned stock in the other, held entitled to
redeem latter's property. Under statute anyone with existing pecuniary interest in
property is entitled to redeem against certificate of delinquency for taxes. Kienbaum
v. New Republic Co., 139 Wash. 298, 246 Pac. 925 (1926). See collected cases in
Decennial Digests, Taxation Key 697(4), (5).
126 IowA CODE AN. §§ 446-18, 447.9 (1949). Lohr v. Kern, 241 Iowa 1371, 44
N.W.2d 408 (1950). Clift v. Frenche, 83 N.J. Eq. 437, 91 Ati. 817 (Ch. 1914).
Statutory requirements as to service of notice of expiration of right to redeem from
tax sale must be fully met; no presumption being indulged. Fidelity Inv. Co. v.
White, 208 Iowa 519, 223 N.W. 884 (1929), modified, 208 Iowa 519, 225 N.W. 868
(1929). See collected cases in Decennial Digests, Taxation Key 701.
127 Elder v. Board of County Com'rs, 33 Colo. 475, 81 Pac. 244 (1905).
128 Harmon v. Steed, 49 Fed. 779 (C.C.D. W.Va. 1892). States vary on whether
or not the amount required to redeem must include subsequent taxes paid by the
purchaser; owner on redemption of land must pay all-taxes for years intervening
between tax sale and exercise of right of redemption. St. Bernard Syndicate v. Grace,
169 La. 666, 125 So. 848 (1929).
129 Threadgill v. Home Loan Co., 219 Ala. 411, 122 So. 401 (1929). Interest
rate to which holder of tax certificate is entitled is determined by statute in force
when sale was made. Kirkman v. Stoker, 201 N.C. 9, 158 S.E. 551 (1931).
130 Reynolds v. Bickers-Goodwin Co., 161 Ga. 378, 131 S.E. 55 (1925).
131 Harris v. McMurray, 92 NJ. Eq. 1, 116 Atl. 702 (Ch. 1920). Landowners'
tender of taxes, interest and costs to tax sale purchaser before tax title was recorded,
operated to set aside tax sale. Henderson v. Lambert, 11 La. App. 9, 122 So. 295
(1929).
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How Redemption is Made. - Generally, no particular
formalities are prescribed for effecting the redemption; 32
payment or a tender of payment to the proper party is suffi-
cient.' Some statutes require that redemption payment be
deposited with an official instead of being paid to tax sale
purchaser. 4 In such cases the official, upon receipt of pay-
ment from a party entitled to redeem, is required to issue a
certificate of redemption, which states the essential facts of
the transaction. 5 In addition to being a receipt for payment,
the certificate of redemption in effect annuls the tax sale .3 as
redemption annuls the sale of the property 37 and divests the
tax lien upon which the sale was predicated. 3 On the other
hand, a failure to redeem divests owner of his title to the
property.'
Summary on Delinquent Taxes. - When taxes are de-
linquent, the statutes provide for a sale of the tax certificate
covering such delinquent taxes. This certificate of delinquen-
cy in the hands of a stranger constitutes a lien on the land and
must be redeemed. If the tax certificate has been assigned,
redemption should be made from the last assignee and such
132 Roach v. State, 148 Ala. 419, 39 So. 685 (1905).
133 Aasz. CODe ANN. § 73-823 (1939). Schmitt v. Sapp, 71 Ariz. 48, 223 P.2d
403 (1950); Doud v. Blood, 89 Iowa 237, 56 N.W. 452 (1893). Redemption from
tax sale to non-resident who could not he located, was properly made by depositing
sum sufficient to redeem property with tax collector. Calhoun v. Spell, 167 La. 653,
120 So. 40 (1929). See collected cases in Decennial Digests, Taxation Key 710.
134 Hodsdon v. Weinstein, 251 Mass. 440, 146 N.E. 675 (1925). County treas-
urer accepting payment to redeem land from tax sale to individual purchaser acts
as trustee for holder of tax sale certificate. Money paid to county treasurer to redeem
land from tax sale to individual purchaser belongs to purchaser, not to treasurer nor
to county. Keenan v. McClure, 127 Neb. 466, 255 N.W. 784 (1934).
135 State v. Cranney, 30 Wash. 594, 71 Pac. 50 (1902).
136 Payment of taxes by owner within six months after adjudication of property
to state for unpaid taxes amounted to a redemption, though no redemption certifi-
cate was issued by the sheriff. Little v. Smith, 44 So.2d 377 (La. App. 1950) ; Drew
v. Bowman County, 60 N.D. 410, 235 N.W. 138 (1931). See collected cases in Decen-
nial Digests, Taxation Key 713.
137 "The redemption creates no rights in the land. It merely annuls the tax sale
and leaves the title as if the sale had not been made." Sunderman Inv. Co. v. Craig-
head, 143 Minn. 286, 173 N.W. 653 (1919).
138 Cole v. Rice, 74 Conn. 680, 51 Atl. 1083 (1902).
139 O'Day v. Bowker, 143 Mass. 59, 9 N.W. 16 (1886).
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redemption should thereafter be shown on the abstract. The
issuance of tax certificates is of course controlled by statute,
and very often when a party buys up one certificate, the lien
resulting therefrom is usually protected by paying taxes which
subsequently accrue. The redemption of these certificates, by
payment, will always forestall a foreclosure of the tax certifi-
cates. Taxes are often forfeited to the county or state for non-
payment, but municipalities, counties and states may pur-
chase only if permitted by statute. Generally the sale of the
certificate is first offered to private bidders, and if there are
no bids, the tax certificates are bought in by the municipality,
county or state. Redemption of tax certificates may be made
by anyone having an interest in the lands, but generally the
taxes are paid or redeemed by the owner or by a mortgagee to
protect his mortgage interest. The holder of a tax certificate
has an equitable title, and the purchaser has a lien until the
time of redemption has expired. This lien will entitle the
owner to a tax deed after expiration of the period of redemp-
tion.
Federal Estate and State Inheritance Taxes. - All death
taxes are levied either on the privilege granted the deceased
of transmitting his property to his heirs, or on the privilege
granted the heirs of receiving that property. The estate tax is
levied upon the right to transmit property at death. The fed-
eral tax is an estate tax, imposed upon and measured by the
estate that the deceased leaves, and levied against the estate
as a unit without regard to the shares received by different
beneficiaries or heirs. It is a transfer tax levied on the priv-
ilege of transferring property to one's heirs at death and not
on the property itself, though it is measured in any given
instance by the value of the property so transferred. The state
tax is an inheritance tax levied on the right of heirs to receive
property from a deceased person and is imposed upon and
measured by the share each heir receives. Since it is levied on
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the right to succeed to a deceased person's property, it is
sometimes called a "succession tax." 140
Statutes commonly require the filing of an inventory in an
estate, and the value of the estate for tax purposes is usually
determined by a formal appraisement,' 4 ' although under cer-
tain statutes the judge may determine the value and amount
of the tax without appointing appraisers. A notice of the time
and place of appraisement is given to all parties interested in
the estate. The statutes further provide for investigation by a
state official or by a state board and the furnishing of a certi-
ficate showing either that the tax has been determined and
paid or that no tax was due. Joint interests in property includ-
ing joint tenancies, tenancies in common, tenancies by the
entirety and community property interests, are subject to
federal tax, 42 and are subject to state inheritance taxes when
made so by statute.
Transfers Made in Contemplation of Deuth.-The federal
estate tax law provides that there must be included in the
gross estate of a deceased person the value of all property, or
any interest therein, which that person has previously trans-
ferred "at any time ... by trust or otherwise, in contempla-
140 "Inheritance Tax" is not a tax on property but an excise, and may be a tax
on transmission of property by a deceased person and chargeable upon the whole
estate, in which case it is called "probate duty or estate tax," or it may be on
privilege of taking property by will or inheritance or by succession in any other
form on death of owner, in which case it is imposed on legacy or share received and
is called "legacy or succession tax." In re Rosing's Estate, 337 Mo. 544, 85 S.W.2d
495 (1935). Basis of both estate and transfer or succession taxes is privilege accorded
by state for devolution of property from one person to another on death. In re
Weiden's Estate, 144 Misc. 854, 259 N.Y. Supp. 573 (Surr. Ct. 1932); In re Down-
er's Estate, 101 Vt. 167, 142 At]. 78 (1928) ; In re Merrill's Will, 212 Wis. 15, 248
N.W. 909 (1933). See collected cases in Decennial Digests, Taxation Key 856.
141 Appraisal of property is made as of the date of the owner's death, sub-
sequent appreciation or depreciation in value being immaterial. In re Spitley's
Estate, 124 Cal. App. 642, 13 P.2d 385 (1932); Insel v. Wright County, 208 Iowa
295, 225 N.W. 378 (1929); In re Caputo's Estate, 142 Misc. 716, 255 N.Y. Supp.
387 (Surr. Ct. 1932). Dividends and interest accruing after decedent's death should
not be included in valuation of stock for transfer tax. In re SilIcock' Estate, 222
App. Div. 69, 225 N.Y. Supp. 339 (2d Dep't 1927).
142 INT. REv. CODE § 811(e). See state statutes.
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tion of death." Even where the deceased has made an outright
and complete gift of property during his lifetime the value of
that property will be taxable in his estate at his death if the
gift was "in contemplation of death." 143 It is extremely diffi-
cult to determine when transfers are so made, 144 and the at-
torney examining title can only watch for any great differ-
ence between the date of the deed and the date of recording,
such discrepancy indicating that the deed was withheld from
record during the lifetime of the grantor.
The lien for estate taxes arises at the moment of the de-
cedent's death and is not required to be recorded as a condi-
tion precedent to its validity against judgment creditors,
mortgagees, pledgees, and the like. Thus, so far as estate
taxes are concerned, we have a lien which comes into existence
prior to the assessment or demand for payment of the under-
lying tax and as to which no recordation is required for its
validity. It is actually an unrecorded tax lien and such a lien
presents an obvious threat to certainty in title transactions.
For example, property transferred by the decedent during
his lifetime, which is included in the gross estate for federal
estate tax purposes by reason of the fact that the gift was
made in contemplation of death or to take effect in possession
and enjoyment at or after death, is subject to the lien of the
federal estate tax. The Code further provides, however, that
whenever any part of such property is sold by any person in
possession to a bona fide purchaser for an adequate and full
consideration, the federal lien is then lifted from the property
itself; but a like lien attaches to other property of the person
selling the property.
45
143 Id., § 811(c). See state statutes.
144 See the leading case of United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 119 (1931), in
which the court says: "It is sufficient if contemplation of death be the inducing
cause of the transfer whether or not death is believed to be near." It was held that
an inter vivos gift was not taxable if the motive was to accomplish some purpose
desirable to the donor if he continued to live.
145 INT. R.V. CODE § 827(h
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Federal estate taxes are barred by statute after ten years46
and several states have statutes barring inheritance taxes in
periods varying from seven to ten years, but this matter of
state taxes should always be checked with the statutes. In
certain states inheritance taxes are "a lien upon the property
transferred until paid" and in those states there should be a
specific showing by receipt or otherwise that the tax has been
determined and paid or that no tax was due. It appears that
there should be a bar in all states and generally a ten-year
period for collection of inheritance taxes should be sufficient,
but some of the states have not seen fit to pass such legis-
lation.
Gift Tax Lien. - Section 1009 of the Internal Revenue
Code creates a lien for gift taxes comparable to the above
discussed lien for estate taxes. The gift tax lien exists for a
period of ten years from the time the gifts are made, and the
lien attaches to the property comprising the gift in the hands
of the donee. As in the case of the estate tax lien, the lien is
lifted from the property if the donee sells it for an adequate
and full consideration, but the lien then attaches to all other
property of the donee. 4
The rate (effective October 21, 1942) is three-fourths of
the federal estate tax rate. The exemptions are: (1) $3000.00
of gifts in each year to each donee; (2) gifts for charitable,
religious and educational purposes; and (3) $30,000.00 of
gifts to all donees in all years combined.'48
The donor is required to file a return with the Collector of
Internal Revenue in his district on or before March 15th fol-
lowing the close of the calendar year.'49 At that time, also, the
146 Id., § 827(a). "Unless the tax is sooner paid in full, it shall be a lien for ten
years upon the gross estate of the decedent. .. ."
147 NT. REv. CODE § 1009. (Lien for tax).
148 INT. REV. CODE §§ 1003-1004.
149 INT. REV. CODE §§ 1006(b), 1008-1009. Under statutes providing that gift
tax shall be paid by donor on or before fifteenth day of March following close of
calendar year, and that if tax is not paid when due, donee under trust agreement
became directly liable for tax when donor failed to pay it, and trustee was not en-
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tax is payable by the donor. If the commissioner is satisfied
that the tax liability has been fully discharged or provided
for, he may under regulations prescribed by him, with the
approval of the Secretary of the Treasury issue his certificate
releasing any of the property from the lien imposed.
E. MECHANICS' LIENS
A mechanic's lien is a lien or claim upon real estate to
secure payment for work or labor performed on, or materials
furnished for, buildings or other improvements, and the labor
or material must have been furnished at the request or with
the consent, express or implied, of the owner of the real
estate."0 Mechanics' liens are valid prior liens over all other
claims, such as mortgages, and judgments given or taken after
the visible commencement of work,' 5 and the term covers all
claims for labor, whether skilled or unskilled, and for all
building materials furnished. The lien only attaches to the
very property upon which the work was done, and has no
effect on other pieces of real estate of the owner.'52 The
,majority of states have laws providing that the work to which
titled to be reimbursed by donor's estate for gift tax paid by trustee and expenses
in connection therewith. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Anthony, 13 NJ. Super. 596,
81 A.2d 191 (Ch. 1951), aff'd, 18 NJ. Super 49, 86 A.2d 594 (App. Div. 1952).
150 A labor or materialman's lien must be grounded on an express or implied
contract. Lee v. Sas, 53 So.2d 114 (Fla. 1951). A person claiming mechanics' liens
who could show no contract for furnishing material and labor with owners of the
premises could claim no lien against the property. Finn v. Grant, 224 Iowa 527, 278
N.W. 225 (1938). See also Delap v. Parcell, 230 Wis. 152, 283 N.W. 305 (1939). See
collected cases in Decennial Digests, Mechanics' Liens Key 55(1).
151 Where basement was excavated by contractor in contemplation of and as
part of project of building a house, and there was no abandonment of project, and
mortgage covering realty was recorded subsequent to excavation, mechanics' and
materialmen's liens attached and had priority over mortgage under statute, not-
withstanding short lapse of time between date of excavation and beginning of con-
struction, and notwithstanding deed to realty was acquired after basement was
excavated. MiNN. STAT. § 514.15 (1949). Brettschneider v. Wellman, 230 Minn. 225,
41 N.W.2d 255 (1950). Where last work in installation of heating plant in garage
was done on October 27, 1948, mortgages covering garage building and land were
dated November 1, and November 9, 1948, the lien took precedence over the mort-
gages. Coullard v. O'Connor, 97 N.H. 89, 81 A.2d 205 (1951). See collected cases in
Decennial Digests, Mechanic's Liens Key 198.
152 Where dwelling constructed on twenty-acre ranch was necessary to operation
of ranch and benefited the entire tract, imposing a mechanic's lien for material
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the owner is entitled under a contract must be entirely per-
formed before the contractor can file a lien, but where owners'
payments are made in instalments, some codes permit the
filing of a lien when the owner defaults in the payment of an
instalment. Liens usually take precedence according to the
time of their filing in the county clerk's office. In some states
subcontractors who have not had direct dealings with the
owners may nevertheless file liens against the property for
the work performed by them.
In any situation where a building is being constructed or
repairs are being made and the construction or repairs are
begun before the date of the mortgage, the contractor, sub-
contractor, or material company can file a mechanic's lien
which will be prior to the mortgage, even though it is filed
after the date of the mortgage. Persons performing work or
furnishing materials for the improvement of property are by
statute entitled to a lien thereon, without filing any notice or
taking other proceedings in connection therewith. 53
Inspection. - The purchaser is required to take notice of
possible liens for labor or material for which in most states no
record need be made and no notice need be given other than
that afforded by the improvements themselves for a period of
30 to 90 days from the time the last item is furnished."4 An
attorney is therefore in no position to state at the time of
furnished upon entire tract rather than upon a portion thereof was not an abuse of
discretion. W. R. Spalding Lumber Co. v. Fradkin, 68 Cal. App.2d 308, 156 P.2d 450
(1945).
153 A mechanic's lien relates back to the time the material was furnished and
used in the building, and until that time it is inchoate only. American Surety Co. of
New York v. Francescus, 127 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1942). A mechanic's lien relates
back to date of visible commencement of work. Brown v. Brown & Co., 25 Tenn.
App. 509, 169 S.W.2d 431 (1941).
154 Newt Olson Lumber Co. v. Cue, 104 Cal. App.2d 477, 232 P.2d 64 (1951);
Sterling Electric Co. v. Kent, 233 Minn. 31, 45 N.W.2d 709 (1951); Peccole v. Luce
& Goodfellow Inc., 66 Nev. 360, 212 P.2d 718 (1949). The statutes in Wisconsin
distinguish between a principal contractor and a subcontractor, the former having
six months after the date of the last charge for labor or materials and the latter
having 60 days. Wis. STAT. §§ 289.01, 289.08 (1951). See collected cases in Decennial
Digest, Mechanic's Liens Key 132(1).
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closing a purchase or a loan that the property is not subject
to a mechanic's lien for which a statement may thereafter be
filed, unless he or his client has made sufficient investigation of
the premises to determine that no improvements are in pro-
gress at the time and that none have been made within the
preceding number of days allowed by the statutes. If a lien
statement is filed within the required time, the act keeps the
lien alive for another limited time, usually one to two years,
within which time it is necessary to assert the lien by a bill of
complaint; otherwise the lien or the right to enforce it expires
on the last date of the period.155 These liens may be dis-
charged by any of the usual methods, and in case of payment
a provision is usually made for an express release by the
claimant on the face of the lien record or by a recorded writ-
ten instrument.
Priority Over Mechanics' Liens: Construction Loans. -
Since a mechanic's lien relates back to the date of the first
visible commencement of work, it is advisable to have a pic-
ture of the property taken by a reputable surveyor prior to
the commencement of construction. The surveyor will photo-
graph the property if requested, and will certify that as of a
certain date, no visible work had been started. Since a
mechanic's lien is also superior to a ifiortgage, a mortgagee
should insure his priority by obtaining such a photograph and
by recording the mortgage prior to the time construction is
started. Since the effective date of any mechanic's lien will
relate back to the time when labor or material was first furn-
ished, it follows that the mortgage will be on record prior to
that time and will be a first lien. This is borne out by the de-
cisions. A mortgage executed in good faith to secure advances
to pay for labor performed upon a building and materials
furnished therefor, and which advances were made, although
155 A mechanic's lien statement is not effectual to perfect a lien if it shows
affirmatively upon its face that it was filed too late, even though the fact may have
been otherwise. Olson v. Heath Lumber Mfg. Co., 37 Minn. 298, 33 N.W. 791 (1887).
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after the commencement of the building, will take precedence
over liens for labor and material.'56
F. OTHER LIENS AND ENCUMBRANCES
Whenever there are recitals in deeds, mortgages or other
instruments in the chain of title creating liens against the
property, the purchaser is charged with notice of the lien
created thereby and will take the property subject thereto.
The attorney should therefore determine whether or not the
particular lien is barred by limitation, and, if not, the lien
should be discharged by proper quitclaim deed or in some
other manner satisfactory to the parties. The liens most
frequently encountered in practice are those created by re-
citals in deeds (support of grantor;"" particular charges in
favor of named persons), charges created by will, charges
created by court decree, and recitals in deeds that the proper-
ty is subject to mortgages or trust deeds.
156 Wisconsin Planing-Mill Co.v. Schuda, 72 Wis. 277, 39 N.W. 558 (1888).
This case was approved and followed in Interior Woodwork Co. v. Larson, 207 Wis.
1, 238 N.W. 822 (1931). A materialman need not have actual notice of mortgage,
recorded before first material was furnished mortgagor to give mortgage priority
over materialman's lien. Queal Lumber Co. v. McNeal, 226 Iowa 631, 284 N.W. 479
(1939). A mortgage in hands of assignee takes precedence over mechanic's lien
which attached prior to assignment but subsequent to execution of mortgage. Finlay-
son v. Waller, 64 Idaho 618, 134 P.2d 1069 (1943). Liens of mortgages, deeds of
trust, judgments, and other encumbrances including attachments, created subsequent
to time when labor lien attaches or subsequent to time to which labor lien relates,
are subordinate to liens of claimants for work or labor performed. White v. Con-
stitution Min. & Mill. Co., 56 Idaho 403, 55 P.2d 152 (1936). See collected cases in
Decennial Digests, Mechanic's Liens Key 197.
157 The provisions of a deed requiring grantee, in addition to supporting
grantors, to pay grantor's debts, doctor bills, funeral expenses, cost of erecting
monument, taxes, assessments, interest and requiring grantee to operate farm con-
veyed and to use proceeds for such purpose created a lien on the land paramount
to creditor's rights. Federal Land Bank v. Luckenbill, 213 Ind. 616, 13 N.E.2d 531
(1938).
A provision, in a deed executed by a mother to her son, that the son should
furnish the mother with a home on the premises so long as she might desire it con-
stituted a "covenant running with the land" and was binding on grantee and all
subsequent holders of title including one acquiring title by foreclosure of mortgage
executed by the son. Glendening v. Federal Land Bank, 112 Ind. App. 162, 44
N.E.2d 251 (1942). Under deed from father to son reciting a consideration of
parental love and affection and requiring son "to further pay'" to father one-third
of rent received from land conveyed should father demand it, as long as he lived,
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It is frequently advisable to suggest that a survey be made
in order to show the exact boundaries of the property,'58
whether the buildings are located within the lot lines,'59 and
whether there are any encroachments. In addition, the pur-
chaser should be satisfied that there is no use of the property,
by persons other than the owner, 6 ' of driveways or passage-
ways so as to establish an easement over it. Any substantial
encroachment constitutes an encumbrance,'.. which would
permit the purchaser to reject title. 2
Clinton Flick*
the reservation of one-third of the rentals was valid as a "condition running with
the land" and hence purchase of such land from the son by purchasers who had
notice from recorded deed that full consideration for land had not been paid, were
subject to the lien of the grantor on the land to secure payments of the rents.
Haven v. Wallace, 290 Ky. 314, 160 S.W.2d 619 (1941).
158 Though contract granting right of way was not recorded, possession of por-
tion thereof by railroad put purchaser on inquiry as to extent. Dunford v. Dardan-
elle & R. R., 171 Ark. 1036, 287 S.W. 170 (1926). Passageway located one-half on
property to be conveyed, and subject to use of others, held "defective title." Her-
shorn v. Rubenstein, 259 Mass. 288, 156 N.E. 251 (1927).
159 Where tenant's possession extends beyond premises covered by recorded
lease, an intending purchaser has duty to inquire as to tenant's rights not included
in the lease. Three Sixty Five Club v. Shostak, 104 Cal. App.2d 735, 232 P.2d 546
(1951). Actual possession of land is notice to the world of a claim thereto, and one
who, knowing land to be held by one person, buys it from another, will be charged
with notice of an unrecorded deed held by party in possession. Taylor v. Perdue, 206
Ga. 763, 58 S.E.2d 902 (1950). If a person purchases an estate from owner, knowing
it to be in possession of tenants, he is bound to inquire into their estates, and is
affected with notice of all facts in relation thereto. Nikas v. United Const. Co., 34
Tenn. App. 435, 239 S.W.2d 41 (1950). See collected cases in Decennial Digests,
Vendor and Purchaser Key 232(2).
160 Keilly v. Severson, 149 Wis. 251, 254, 135 N.W. 875 (1912).
161 One purchasing mortgaged land, without knowledge of mortgage, after being
told by one mortgagee that he had lease thereon, was entitled to ascribe mortgagee's
possession thereof to lease, and under no duty to inquire further as to additional
or other agreement between vendor and mortgagees; latter's possession being con-
sistent with title they claimed. Dilts v. Mecham, 48 Wyo. 342, 45 P.2d 920 (1935).
162 Possession of realty by grantors in warranty deed, containing no reservations
of title or interest held not to impart notice to purchaser from grantee of grantor's
secret equities. Creighton v. Dorsey, 140 Kan. 688, 38 P.2d 90 (1934). Joint occu-
pancy of premises as family home did not impart notice of wife's claim of any
interest other than homestead right. Storz v. Clarke, 117 Neb. 488, 221 N.W. 101
(1928).
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